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Article 
Urban Robotics: Achieving Autonomy in Design and 
Regulation of Robots and Cities 
JESSE WOO, JAN WHITTINGTON & RONALD ARKIN 
Cities across the United States are facing a wave of urban robotic products that 
combine artificial intelligence with the basic elements of transportation technology. 
The firms that deploy these technologies intend to both disrupt and serve many 
markets with their products, including but not limited to the transportation of people 
and cargo, surveillance, security, entertainment, and the collection and use of vast 
troves of data from the sensing capabilities of their products. In the evolution of 
technology, however, automated vehicles, delivery robots, security robots, and 
follow-me drones or robots are not separate products; they represent one overall 
movement to combine basic technologies of mobility with modern sensors, machine 
learning, and data science, into robotics intended for use in urban settings. To the 
firms, cities are concentrated markets for services, testbeds for imperfect artificial 
intelligence, collections of persons to engage in beta-testing of their robotics, and 
public spaces to be shaped in their interest to ease access to public rights-of-way 
and embed intelligent communication systems in urban space. To the cities, urban 
robotics foster technological optimism that is often unrealistic for either the 
technology or the economics of the firm, and their design and deployment poses new 
hazards for people in public space and private life. 
As robots continue to enter the public rights-of-way in cities across the country, 
lawmakers need to find ways to regulate these technologies in the public interest. 
The old Facebook mantra of “move fast and break things” becomes even more 
concerning when the technology in question has a physical presence and can 
actually break things or harm people. In addition, the introduction of connected, 
mobile, sensing robots into public space on a mass scale accelerates already 
shifting norms around privacy and surveillance in public places. Policymakers at 
the local, state, and federal levels are taking a variety of approaches to regulate 
urban robots with these issues in mind. While some may call the diversity of 
approaches an impediment to innovation, we argue that at this stage of 
technological development, the laboratory of democracy offers the best possible 
path forward to regulate this emerging technology in the public interest. Therefore, 
 
we argue that broad federal preemption of robotics technologies, like autonomous 
vehicles, is premature. Cities are in fact the best suited sites of experimentation for 
autonomous vehicles, drones, and other urban robots, and city lawmakers should 
be allowed autonomy in their effort to regulate the design and deployment of urban 
robotics in public space. States and the federal government should provide technical 
and regulatory expertise and a backstop against a race to the bottom, but their 
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Urban Robotics: Achieving Autonomy in Design and 
Regulation of Robots and Cities 
JESSE WOO, JAN WHITTINGTON & RONALD ARKIN * 
INTRODUCTION 
Are cities ready for self-driving, artificially intelligent vehicles and 
robotics? The urban marketplace is increasingly filled with products 
emblematic of “smart” cities, from widely discussed autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) to smaller variations on the theme, such as robotics for delivery, 
security, and entertainment.1 Altogether, such urban robotics represent a 
new wave of technology in which digital sensors, networked devices, and 
their associated data stores are given the algorithmic, physical, and legal 
means to move in public space.2 As time goes on, the public is increasingly 
likely to encounter self-driving vehicles, robots, and drones on city streets, 
sidewalks, and in urban airspace. How should cities respond to these new 
and impending technologies?  
Firms in this sector have technological, market, and financial interest in 
testing and deploying their products in public space, but the implications for 
cities span a broad array of intended and unintended consequences. Cities 
are natural sites of experimentation for firms interested in bringing these 
products to market, and the perception of economic opportunity associated 
                                                                                                                     
* Jesse Woo is a Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Scholar on the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University. 
Jan Whittington is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Design and Planning and the 
Director of the Urban Infrastructure Lab at the University of Washington. Ronald Arkin is a Regent’s 
Professor and Director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory in the College of Computing at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. 
1 Jeffrey Mervis, Are We Going Too Fast on Driverless Cars?, SCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/12/are-we-going-too-fast-driverless-cars (“Transportation 
experts have developed six levels that describe autonomous vehicles. In general, a higher number means 
a more independent vehicle, with less for the human driver to do, thanks to more sophisticated sensors, 
cameras, and algorithms. . . . A level-four car . . . will operate autonomously only under certain 
conditions, say in good weather during the day, or on a road with controlled access. The technology for 
that capability already exists.”); Paul Miller, Taking a Ride on Segway’s Loomo Robot, VERGE (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16874220/segway-loomo-robot-hands-on-ces-2018; Olivia 
Solon, Robots Are Invading Malls (and Sidewalks) Near You, MIT TECH. REV. (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601635/robots-are-invading-malls-and-sidewalks-near-you/ (“[A] 
small but growing number of human-scale mobile robots . . . are finding employment outside the confines 
of industrial settings like factories. They’re invading consumer spaces including retail stores, hotels, and 
sidewalks in a quest to deliver services . . . .”). 
2 On the theory of the combinatorial evolution of technology, including artificial intelligence, see 
W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 42–43 (2009). 
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with tech firms is leading city representatives to reclaim public spaces, 
transforming them into testbeds for product development.3 It is worth noting, 
however, that experimentation involves trial and error, and there are 
limitations to the ability of artificial intelligence to navigate the wide range 
of conditions and events that comprise the urban environment.4 Ultimately, 
the design of the environment may be as important to the success of urban 
robotics as the design of the hardware and software in those products.5 These 
are matters that city officials care about; the design, function, and finance of 
urban built environments are generally the purview of local government. 
Significant new questions in law, such as legal liability for the performance 
of artificially intelligent devices, are being addressed as autonomous 
vehicles and devices enter public rights-of-way.6 Additionally, artificial 
                                                                                                                     
3 A natural site of experimentation is the intended market for the device, analogous to the natural 
habitat for a species. On the topic of city representatives accommodating firms, see Emily Badger, Pave 
Over the Subway? Cities Face Tough Bets on Driverless Cars, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/upshot/driverless-cars-vs-transit-spending-cities.html. Regarding 
a partnership with Ford in which Miami becomes a testbed, Mayor Carlos A. Giménez of Miami-Dade, 
Florida said, “We want to learn from Ford what it is we need to do to get ready for these vehicles, so that 
when AVs become a reality, fully, we’ll be one of the first communities to get them . . . . We want to let 
the world know that Miami is ready to be a testbed.” Laura Bliss, Self-Driving Pizza Just Hit Miami, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/02/self-driving-pizza-just-hit-
miami/554138/.  
4 Veronica Rocha, Crime-Fighting Robot Hits, Rolls Over Child at Silicon Valley Mall, L.A. TIMES 
(July 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-crimefighting-robot-hurts-child-bay-
area-20160713-snap-story.html; see also Futuris, Urban Robots: A New Generation of Robots, YOUTUBE 
(May 10, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t8cstaDhjjI (discussing the extent to which 
roboticists depend on the design of the environment); Jeremy Kahn, An Idea for Making Self-Driving 
Cars Safer: Reprogram Humans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-driverless-car-safety-20180817-story.html (discussing 
the safety of self-driving cars). One of the many challenges of designing robots to operate among people 
in an urban environment is, “for example, autonomous navigation, that’s to say [the robots would] be 
able to move around and find out where they are, those are things that to us seem very routine and very 
simple, but for the robots they are very complex.” Futuris, supra.  
5 As the National Association of City Transportation Officials says: “Automated vehicle technology 
holds many promises for cities, but the potential benefits of automation are not guaranteed. City policies 
must proactively guide the technology to prioritize people-centric design.” NACTO, BLUEPRINT FOR 
AUTONOMOUS URBANISM 10 (2017), https://nacto.org/publication/bau/blueprint-for-autonomous-
urbanism/. U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx notes that vehicle-to-infrastructure 
communication is a “critical component of a connected vehicle environment—a system of hardware, 
software, firmware and wireless communication that enables the dynamic transfer of data between 
vehicles as well as between vehicles and elements of the roadway infrastructure.” U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
FHWA Announces Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Guidance, TRANSPORTATION.GOV (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/fhwa0317. See also Futuris, supra note 4 (describing one 
method to overcome the challenge of designing a robot to navigate the urban environment, “this campus 
is equipped with Wi-Fi internet and twenty cameras to allow the robots to navigate around; the same 
setup would be needed in any city for [the robots] to be able to work autonomously”). 
6 The death of a pedestrian by an autonomous vehicle test driven by Uber in Arizona highlights the 
importance of these issues. The city of Tempe, Arizona is facing a lawsuit for inadequate street design 
from the relatives of a pedestrian killed by an automated Uber vehicle. Ryan Randazzo & Paulina Pineda, 
Tempe Faces $10 Million Claim in Uber Self-Driving Vehicle Fatality, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2019), 
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intelligence imbues devices with the purpose of replacing as well as 
augmenting the roles and responsibilities of persons, and this tension exists 
at the local level.7 Lastly, these products generate rich data stores about the 
public, bringing market potential along with the coupled moral hazard of 
data monetization and loss of privacy, including surveillance.8 Which parties 
are positioned to benefit from this experimentation, and which will absorb 
the costs? In the face of these potentially widespread and enduring industrial 
and technological changes, how might cities act in the public interest? 
 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/02/03/tempe-faces-10-million-claim-uber-self-driving-
vehicle-fatality/2761875002/. Experts in the field on the inevitability of the crash said “it [was] only a 
matter of time,” as the technology “is not mature enough to be completely driverless,” and “it is unlikely 
that a person would be able to prevent a crash by taking over a self-driving system at the last minute.” 
Larry Greenemeier, Uber Self-Driving Car Fatality Reveals the Technology’s Blind Spots, SCI. AM. 
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/uber-self-driving-car-fatality-reveals-the-
technologys-blind-spots1/. See also Mike Isaac et al., Uber’s Vision of Self-Driving Cars Begins to Blur, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/technology/uber-self-driving-
cars.html (describing the firm’s choice between continuing or abandoning investment in its autonomous 
vehicle unit); Timothy B. Lee, NTSB: Uber’s Sensors Worked; Its Software Utterly Failed in Fatal 
Crash, ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/05/emergency-brakes-were-
disabled-by-ubers-self-driving-software-ntsb-says/ (summarizing findings from an investigation by the 
National Transportation Safety Board); Ian Wren, Uber Suspends Self-Driving Tests After Pedestrian Is 
Killed in Arizona, NPR (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/19/594950197/uber-suspends-self-driving-tests-after-pedestrian-is-killed-in-
arizona?sc=tw (describing the firm’s decision to suspend tests of self-driving vehicles in the wake of the 
fatal crash).  
7 Urban robots and the firms that deploy them are on “a quest to deliver services alongside human 
staff members for a fraction of the price of employing people to do a variety of typically unexciting 
tasks.” Solon, supra note 1; see Mervis, supra note 1 (“Technologists see AVs as the next step in what’s 
called ‘mobility as a service.’ That is what taxi fleets and ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft 
now offer. What is attracting AV investors is the huge payoff from removing the biggest cost of that 
service, namely, the person behind the wheel.”). 
8 See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., MONETIZING CAR DATA: NEW SERVICE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES 
TO CREATE NEW CUSTOMER BENEFITS 7–9 (2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20I
nsights/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing-car-data.ashx (outlining the business opportunity 
created by the generation of data from autonomous vehicles); Kayla Matthews, How Anonymous Cars 
Will Make Big Data Even Bigger, DATAFLOQ (Jan. 7, 2018), https://datafloq.com/read/how-
autonomous-cars-will-make-big-data-even-bigger/1795 (“[A]utonomous vehicles, or ‘smart’ cars of the 
future, are nothing more than a cog in a much larger data-collection system.”); Matt McFarland, Your 
Car’s Data May Be More Valuable Than the Car Itself, CNN  (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/07/technology/car-data-value/index.html (“A self-driving car can 
generate 1 gigabyte of data per second. . . . More data means more potential money. All sorts of creative 
business opportunities will arise. . . . ‘By collecting data from vehicles, you effectively digitize the public 
space, unlocking potential safety, security, municipal and commercial benefits . . . .’”); Sivaramakirshnan 
Somasegar & Daniel Li, Business Models Will Drive the Future of Autonomous Vehicles, TECHCRUNCH 
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/25/business-models-will-drive-the-future-of-
autonomous-vehicles/ (“The issues of who owns data, who can access data and who will process the data 
will be a critical question [sic] for companies and regulators over the next several years. As vehicles 
generate and consume more and more data, it will be critical to watch who controls the data and how 
they decide to monetize the data.”). 
 
 
326 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
The answers to these questions lie as much in the institutional 
arrangements designed to govern this new wave of technologies as they do 
in the intrinsic capabilities of these products. Anyone evaluating the existing 
policy environment for artificially intelligent devices today would find 
technological optimism, conflicting perspectives of the public interest, and 
preemptive acts at the state and federal levels.9 In particular, preemption in 
current policymaking raises issues because the consequences and cost of 
product design, including safety and surveillance as well as convenience and 
expense, play out at the local level.10 As city officials ask their residents to 
coexist with robots and negotiate with firms over the transaction costs that 
accompany these products, they need the flexibility and funding necessary 
to adapt to market conditions and the authority to act as market makers.11 
Preemption cuts short the legal experimentation and regulatory competition 
that could provide a race to the top for firms and policymakers in the public 
interest. In the best of circumstances, federal agencies provide guidance and 
domain expertise, while states provide a supportive framework for cities to 
operate in with a backstop against the expansive possibility of harm. In the 
most egregious cases, preemption threatens to revoke the rights of the 
                                                                                                                     
9 See Ralph Nader, Driverless-Car Legislation Is Unsafe at This Speed, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-car-legislation-is-unsafe-at-this-speed-1534973755 
(“Mr. Thune’s bill [the AV START Act (S. 1885)] would eviscerate vehicle regulations by allowing 
companies to sell potentially limitless numbers of driverless cars that would be exempt from established 
federal safety standards. This bill would also pre-empt states from exercising their own safety duties.”); 
Noah Seigel, Will the Feds Handcuff Cities on Automated Vehicles?, PUB. SQUARE (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2017/11/09/will-feds-handcuff-cities-automated-vehicles (“[AV 
START] includes an insidious clause that . . . preempts states and cities from providing any oversight, 
public information, or policy direction when AVs hit their streets.”). 
10 Susan Crawford, Autonomous Vehicles Might Drive Cities to Financial Ruin, WIRED (June 20, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/autonomous-vehicles-might-drive-cities-to-financial-ruin/ 
(“[M]any cities balance their budgets using money brought in by cars: gas taxes, vehicle registration fees, 
traffic tickets, and billions of dollars in parking revenue [charges that autonomous vehicles can avoid]. . 
. . [Cities are] beginning to look at fees that could be charged [to autonomous vehicles]. . . . But many 
states, urged on by auto manufacturers, won’t let cities take these steps.”); see Seigel, supra note 9 
(“There are many potential benefits to AV technology, but the bill includes an insidious clause that is 
sure to make everything worse: it preempts states and cities from providing any oversight, public 
information, or policy direction when AVs hit their streets.”); see also Lisa Nisenson & Brad Davis, Ten 
Steps Toward Autonomous Urbanism, PUB. SQUARE (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2017/12/11/ten-steps-toward-autonomous-urbanism (discussing ten 
steps that cities can take to prepare for the proliferation of mobility technology).  
11 On the potential for autonomous vehicles to impact local public finance, see Benjamin Y. Clark 
et al., The Impacts of Autonomous Vehicles and E-Commerce on Local Government Budgeting and 
Finance, URBANISM NEXT (Aug. 2017), https://cpb-us-east-1-juc1ugur1qwqqqo4.stackpathdns.com/ 
blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/f/13615/files/2017/07/Impacts-of-AV-Ecommerce-on-Local-Govt-Budget-and-
Finance-SCI-08-2017-2n8wgfg.pdf; Crawford, supra note 10; Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and 
Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study In Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899, 
1964 (2015) (discussing the standardization of public contracts with private technology firms and 
explaining that “[m]id to large-size cities such as Seattle with big information needs and access to 
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persons at the local level, who are asked to bear the risk and cost of residing 
with robots, and to prevent the resolution of conflicts through local levels of 
government.12 Preemption debates in technology law have already arisen 
around the regulation of air carriers,13 the taxation of e-commerce,14 net 
neutrality,15 sharing economy platforms,16 and municipal broadband,17 with 
important consequences. Some proposed federal and state laws and existing 
state statutes already preempt cities on robotics in ways that could impede 
local governments’ autonomy with regard to the design, management, 
operation, and finance of public rights-of-way. Laws that preempt cities 
based on broad or poorly-defined definitions of performance could limit 
local control of the infrastructure that constitutes the operational domain of 
urban robots, irrespective of the public interest.  
The purpose of this Article is to provide a framework through which 
public decision-makers can effectively engage with the firms that are 
bringing artificially intelligent robotics to market in public space. With an 
institutional economic perspective, this Article suggests a means for 
evidence-based policymaking by breaking down design and its evaluation 
into constituent sequential components, recognizing the private and social 
                                                                                                                     
12 See Crawford, supra note 10 (“Cities serve as the front lines of every pressing social problem the 
country is battling: homelessness, illiteracy, inadequate health care, you name it. They don’t have any 
resources to lose. The rise of autonomous vehicles will put struggling sections of cities at a particular 
disadvantage.”); Seigel, supra note 9 (“It is a not a radical idea [sic] to allow cities and local governments 
to lead on transportation policy and technological disruption. Before the advent of the automobile, roads 
were generally financed by local property taxes. When cars became ubiquitous, state and local 
governments adopted vehicle registration fees, fuel and weight mile taxes, and parking meters to help 
pay for and regulate automobiles and their externalities. All of this predated the federal gas tax and the 
interstate highway system. It is likely that local governments will need to foster a similar kind of 
innovation to cope with (and pay for) AVs. These are the kinds of conversations about the public (and 
private) good that are in danger of being preempted by the current version of the AV START bill.”).   
13 Seigel, supra note 9. 
14 Id. 
15 See Jon Brodkin, FCC Will Also Order States to Scrap Plans for Their Own Net Neutrality Laws, 
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/fcc-will-also-order-states-
to-scrap-plans-for-their-own-net-neutrality-laws/ (describing the FCC’s attempts to preempt state net 
neutrality laws); Nicole Flatow, Cities Launch Plan to Protect Net Neutrality, CITYLAB (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/net-neutrality-executive-orders-fcc-mayors-bill-de-blasio/ 
555344/ (describing the efforts of states and localities to counteract FCC preemption measures). As 
Seigel explains, preemption clauses in the 1994 FAA Authorization Act were short-sighted in preventing 
local governments from enacting law or policy that would affect the “price, route, or service” of any air 
carrier “transporting property by air or by motor vehicle,” which was then reinforced in the 1998 Internet 
Tax Freedom Act. Seigel, supra note 9. Together, these acts have prevented local governments from 
taxing the firms that depend on the public provision of local road infrastructure and thus have disrupted 
the long-standing ability of cities and states to ask those who benefit to pay for public improvements. Id. 
16 NICOLE DUPOIS ET AL., CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 
2018 UPDATE 12–16 (2018), https://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report 
%202017.pdf. 
17 Jon Brodkin, States Win the Right to Limit Municipal Broadband, Beating FCC in Court, ARS 
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costs of experimentation in cities, and recommending a limited scope for 
state and federal intervention.18 Part I begins by defining the characteristics 
of the current wave of robotics entering public space, placing public-facing 
robotics within the theory of the nature of technology and elaborating on the 
process of product design with algorithmic feedback for machine learning in 
complex urban environments. Part II explores the opportunities and hazards 
that await cities as sites of experimentation and introduces a comparative 
approach to policymaking to forestall negative externalities while permitting 
technological change. Part III explores the role of cities in the evolving 
policy environment for data privacy in the face of advanced sensing 
technologies, including robotics, that undermine existing legal protections. 
Part IV analyzes laws governing urban robots at the local, state, and federal 
levels and the impact of preemption on cities’ ability to serve as sites of 
experimentation. It recommends against broad express preemption or field 
preemption at the state and federal levels, particularly the broad language in 
proposed federal autonomous vehicle legislation. Part V addresses possible 
counterarguments. The Article ends by presenting concluding thoughts. 
I. URBAN ROBOTICS AND THE QUEST FOR INTELLIGENT DESIGN 
This Part provides an overview of the emerging field of autonomous 
machines in public space, including a section that situates these products in 
the evolution of technology and brings the process of design to the forefront 
of discussion about the benefits and pitfalls of this new wave of technology 
for cities and local residents. 
A. Robots Are Coming to a City Near You 
Companies that make robots are sending their products out into the cities 
of the world. Not to be confused with the spectacular humanoid devices of 
science fiction, the robots entering our city roadways, sidewalks, parking 
lots, and airspace include any machine that can sense, process, and act upon 
the physical world.19 The robots being deployed, tested, and marketed in 
urban public rights-of-way could be said to fall into several categories: 
                                                                                                                     
18 Institutional economics recognizes the polity and judiciary for creating and interpreting the rules 
of the game for economic actors. DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4–5 (1990). 
19 People working in the field are quick to separate artificial general intelligence, such as the 
development of a sentient being, from today’s forms of artificial intelligence: “Artificial intelligence is 
not about building a mind; it’s about the improvement of tools to solve problems.” Gideon Lewis-Kraus, 
The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/ 
magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html; see also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 513, 531 (2015) (“[R]obots are best thought of as systems that sense, process, and act 
upon the world to at least some degree.”). 
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automated vehicles for transporting persons and cargo, delivery robots, 
security robots, and entertainment or companion robots.20   
The automation of vehicles currently gives drivers the impression that 
they may turn their attention away from the road for periods of time,21 but 
the purpose of this technology is to transform human-driven fleets of 
vehicles into services provided with self-driving fleets of vehicles.22 Many 
tech companies and automobile manufacturers are experimenting with these 
capabilities.23 Though most are working on automobiles, recent market 
entrants and hopefuls include automated buses, automated semi-trucks for 
cargo delivery, and personal drones for air travel.24 At the time of this 
writing, thirty-one cities in the United States have active pilot programs for 
automated vehicles, nearly half of the cities of the United States are 
reportedly preparing for them, and twenty-two states have legislation 
encouraging their development.25 It is important to emphasize the rapid pace 
of deployment underway for what is still experimental technology. It was 
only 2016 when the city of Pittsburgh established a test center and became 
an early test site for Uber.26 In the same year, Google rebranded its self-
                                                                                                                     
20 Technologists are also working on robots that can maintain or repair infrastructure such as roads 
or light posts, but we are not aware of any cities in which these systems are currently in use. Jane 
Wakefield, Tomorrow’s Cities: Dubai and China Roll Out Urban Robots, BBC (June 10, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41268996. Cities aside, technologies increasingly include robots 
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driving program as Waymo.27 Google’s Waymo 2019 Safety Report 
identifies twenty-five United States cities in its map of test locations, most 
of which are in the San Francisco Bay Area of California or in proximity to 
its early test site of Chandler, Arizona.28 Other noteworthy cities with 
automated vehicle pilot programs include Atlanta, Denver, Boston, Detroit, 
Las Vegas, Reno, San Antonio, Tampa, Miami, and Washington, D.C.29 
Testing in cities should be distinguished from test centers, as the former 
refers to partial or complete spatial access to the city while the latter refers 
to sites designed for testing purposes with limited public access.30 With or 
without test sites, the number of participating cities has grown rapidly.31 The 
dedication of an area for testing, however, should not imply permanence for 
the technologies or the firms. Following the death of a pedestrian in Arizona, 
Uber temporarily suspended testing and operations of automated vehicles in 
all locations.32 In general, as reports of accidents have accumulated, the tenor 
of news about automated vehicles has changed.33 After several years of 
hype, people may be realizing how difficult it is to replace human judgment 
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behind the wheel with the algorithmic decision-making of artificial 
intelligence.34 One possible outcome could be a shift in attention to devices 
that are smaller in stature: devices that are not designed to transport people. 
Delivery robots are intended to complete last mile logistics—the most 
complex and expensive portion of the shipping system—where products 
move to and from distribution centers and homes or offices.35 The wide 
variation in the characteristics of these devices has them destined for all 
manner of public spaces, including sidewalks, roadways, parking spaces, 
and airspace.36 For example, Starship Technologies’ short, electric, 
six-wheeled robots operate autonomously to deliver items up to forty pounds 
in weight within a two-mile radius, with the possibility of intervention by 
remote operators.37 They have partnered with firms to offer delivery services 
in Redwood City, California and Washington, D.C.38 Robots from Marble, 
Dispatch, Robby, Eliport, and Kiwi strike a similar profile and occupy a 
similar market niche.39 Amazon, a late market entrant, recently unveiled a 
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delivery robot that bears a striking resemblance to Starship’s models, with 
the announcement that they are beginning field testing in Snohomish 
County, Washington.40 Robots like these operate under a patchwork of legal 
rules, sometimes requiring a permit, either because of a lack of regulation or 
permissive state laws.41 Starship representatives have suggested that relaxed 
rules allow their use in Virginia, Florida, Wisconsin, and Idaho, as well as 
Washington, D.C.42 There are also firms competing in this space with larger 
vehicles, which may be subject to many of the same regulations as 
autonomous vehicles for passengers. Nuro’s delivery vehicles are about half 
the size of an automobile, suggesting larger payloads, travel on roadways, 
and the need to occupy a parking space while loading, unloading, or 
charging.43 Reports suggest that Teleretail’s prototype, similar in size, can 
operate within a fifty-mile radius.44 Udelv, whose vehicles may include a 
driver, recently announced plans to begin an operation in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma and a test program with Walmart in Surprise, Arizona.45 Notably, 
automakers envision a role for themselves in the autonomous vehicle 
market.46 Ford has announced that it will test its full-sized automated 
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vehicles for package delivery services,47 and Toyota has unveiled a 
prototype.48 Ford has opted to pair its automated delivery vehicles with a 
more humanoid, bipedal walking robot.49 In addition, at least two firms offer 
delivery services via aerial drones: Flirtey and Matternet.50 Flirtey garnered 
attention in 2016, with its first delivery sanctioned by the Federal Aviation 
Administration of a product from a 7-Eleven to a home via drone.51 Amazon 
Prime Air delivery by drone has been undergoing tests in the UK, but not in 
the United States.52 Reports suggest that Boeing is also entering the market, 
with a drone for payloads of up to 500 pounds.53 
Security robots, which could be said to operate like mobile closed circuit 
television with the capacity to automatically call authorities, are intended to 
reduce the need for human security guards.54 Although such products are 
privately owned and operated, some scholars have conceptualized them as a 
form of automated law enforcement.55 For the most part, security robots 
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have been deployed without ex ante permission from cities.56 The company 
most prevalent in searches for security robots is Knightscope, although there 
are others.57 Robots from Knightscope can be programmed to patrol a 
predefined area and are currently being used or contemplated for use in 
parking lots, residential neighborhoods, and quasi-public areas such as 
corporate campuses, shopping malls, museums, and airports.58 The K5 units 
for outdoor use weigh over 400 pounds, are over five feet tall, and come with 
an electrical pad for charging.59 They are outfitted for 360 degree video 
recording, storage, and streaming, including thermal imaging, reading 
license plates, tracking parked cars, playing pre-recorded messages, and a 
two-way intercom between a remote operator and people who encounter the 
device.60 Also known as “automated data machines,” the devices stream data 
to the company’s “security operations center,” and the firm advertises the 
ability to stream the same to recipients’ online web portals.61 A report in 
October 2017 noted that the firm had already deployed forty-seven of these 
devices for clients in ten states, including venues in Boston, Atlanta, Dallas, 
Sacramento, Washington, D.C., and Tampa.62 Like Knightscope, Segway 
markets the Loomo robot for security use, and the city of York, Pennsylvania 
has experimented with it to augment the city police force’s surveillance and 
first response capabilities.63 In a curious twist, Boston Dynamics suggests 
that security is an appropriate use for their doglike robot, SpotMini.64 Drones 
are also in use in numerous police departments, though the extent to which 
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police use automated devices as opposed to remote control is not clear.65 The 
world’s largest drone manufacturer and the largest police body-camera 
manufacturer recently partnered to sell drones to police departments, and 
critics fear that this partnership will put drones with powerful artificial 
intelligence capabilities, such as facial recognition, in the hands of police 
with little oversight.66  
Entertainment or companion robots represent another wave of 
autonomous devices entering urban space.67 For entertainment, 
synchronized drones, for example, are in use by Disney and were featured 
in the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2018 Winter Olympics.68 The 
film industry is using drones to replace expensive rigging with aerial 
cinematography.69 And, perhaps more importantly for public space, anyone 
can now purchase an aerial drone that follows and video records any 
specified person, animal, or moving object, wherever it goes, for an 
elaborate form of “selfie.”70 Though they appear to be no different from 
remote controlled commercial drones, these devices may be set to 
automatically track a signal or follow an individual and may also be 
equipped with the software necessary to detect and avoid other objects.71 
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Disney World’s First Drones Show, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
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The same “follow me” features are also emerging in devices on roadways 
and sidewalks. Segway’s Loomo robot may be marketed for security, but it 
was also intended for entertainment, as it was designed to be able to follow 
its user, take pictures, and display simple social computing characteristics 
(smiley faces).72 It is a hoverboard that users can ride or load with up to 200 
kilograms of packages, and it is capable of traveling up to eleven miles per 
hour, with a range of twenty-two miles on a single charge and sensors and 
software that includes voice command and facial recognition.73 Seemingly 
interested in reaching all possible markets, Segway has also marketed 
Loomo for autonomous goods delivery, emphasizing the features of design 
for carrying packages.74 Similarly, the company responsible for Vespa 
Scooters is working on Gita, a small cargo “droid” designed to free the user’s 
hands as they traverse dense urban environments.75 Several companies, such 
as Cowa and Travelmate, now offer robotic suitcases with “follow me” 
capabilities, though astute authors question the value of a suitcase that 
contains a battery large enough to pose a hazard to airlines.76 While not 
strictly meant as entertainment (although one writer described Gita as “more 
like having a pet than an artificial intelligence”), these machines are 
designed to delight users while contributing to leisure experiences.77 
Altogether, the urban robotics profiled in this Section represent a 
dizzying array of firms with a rapidly expanding portfolio of products for 
use in the public and quasi-public spaces of cities. The diversity of uses 
envisioned for these technologies, however, belie the fundamental 
characteristics that they share in common: mobility, artificial intelligence, 
communications, and a fine-grained ability to sense the world around them. 
This confluence is the result of technological evolution, which suggests that 
the drivers behind these products have been with us for a long time. 
 
                                                                                                                     
drones do not have object avoidance.”). 
72 Paul Miller, Taking a Ride on Segway’s Loomo Robot, VERGE (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16874220/segway-loomo-robot-hands-on-ces-2018. 
73 Andrew Tarantola, Segway’s Loomo Is the Robotic Hoverboard Nobody Asked For, ENGADGEI 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/03/06/segways-loomo-robotic-hoverboard-hands-on/.  
74 Marrian Zhou, Segway to Introduce Autonomous Delivery Robots at CES 2019, CNET (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/segway-to-introduce-autonomous-delivery-robots-at-ces-2019/.  
75 Ian Bogost, The Cute Robot That Follows You Around the City, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/piaggio-gita-jeffrey-schnapp/554222/.  
76 Paul Brady, This $800 Robot Suitcase Will Follow You Around the Airport, CONDE NASTE 
TRAVELER (May 30, 2018), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/ovis-robot-suitcase-will-follow-you-
around-the-airport; Dean Takahashi, Travelmate Robotics’ Robot Suitcase Will Follow You to CES 2018, 
VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 3, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/01/03/travelmate-robotics-robot-suitcase-
will-follow-you-to-ces-2018/. 
77 Entertainment robots like Gita or the robotic suitcase could conceivably constitute a separate 
“personal service robot” category, but until such use cases actually develop, we will use the current 
classification scheme. Bogost, supra note 75. 
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B. Urban Robots and the Evolution of Technology 
To understand the magnitude and endurance of urban robotics, it may 
be helpful to place these products within the evolutionary theory of 
technology.78  
According to theory, technologies are designed to apply scientific 
knowledge for a purpose, they are in and of themselves assemblies of 
technologies, and their evolution occurs through the recombination of newly 
incorporated phenomena with existing components.79 Technology is 
commonly developed to augment the forces of nature and, as it relies on 
basic science about how the world works, modern technology is understood 
to advance along with discoveries in basic science.80 As products, however, 
technologies are recursive, in that they are made of assemblies of 
components, which are themselves technologies, each harnessing scientific 
knowledge about physical effects and other natural phenomena.81 Given that 
all technologies rely on the understanding and application of natural or 
physical effects, the combinatorial evolution of technology accelerates when 
a new family of phenomena are discovered and incorporated into 
components for further recombination.82  
Urban robotics combine the newfound capacity for autonomous 
controls, brought about by machine learning and artificial intelligence, with 
a multitude of existing sensor, robotic, compute, communication, energy, 
                                                                                                                     
78 See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 23 (presenting a theory of evolution for technology, a theory 
constructed from a “coherent group of general propositions” that can be used to “explain technology’s 
behavior”). 
79 See id. (building an argument about the essence and evolution of technology from “three 
fundamental principles,” first that “all technologies are combinations . . . constructed or put together—
combined—from components or assemblies or subsystems at hand,” second, that “each component of 
technology is itself in miniature a technology,” and third, that “all technologies harness and exploit some 
effect of phenomenon, usually several”). 
80 See id. at 46 (“A technology is always based on some phenomenon or truism in nature that can 
be exploited and used to a purpose.”); id. at 60 (“Science is necessary for the unearthing of modern 
phenomena, the more deeply hidden clusters of effects, and for forming technologies from these.”); id. 
at 59 (distinguishing natural phenomena from technology, “[n]ot every phenomenon of course is 
harnessable for use, but when a family of phenomena is uncovered, a train of technologies follows”). 
81 See id. at 39 (noting that “any technology . . . consists of component building blocks that are also 
technologies, and these consist of subparts that are also technologies, in a repeating (or recurring) pattern” 
combined for a human purpose); id. at 43 (“Combination must work not just by bringing a purpose with 
a concept or principle that matches it. It must provide a main set of assemblies or modules to execute this 
central idea. It must support this with further assemblies, and these again with further assemblies to 
support these. And all these parts and assemblies must be orchestrated to perform together 
harmoniously.”). 
82 See id. at 59, 172 (commenting on William Ogburn’s suggestion that the growth of technologies 
resembles a “compound interest curve,” growing “exponentially”). Arthur says, “[A]s the number of 
technologies increases, the possibilities for combination also increase. . . . [I]f new technologies lead to 
further new technologies, then once the numbers of elements in the collective pass through some 
threshold, the possibilities of combination begin to explode.” Id. at 174.  
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and transportation technologies.83 Given that machines can now be 
programmed to use algorithms that process richly expansive data collected 
from the environment and, flipping the process, modify or develop new 
algorithms based on feedback from the environment, people can and should 
expect products to come to market that attempt to navigate the physical 
environment autonomously.84 In the language of the evolutionary theory of 
technology, nascent human scientific understanding of how the brain works 
is accelerating evolution by providing the opportunity to combine a whole 
new family of artificially intelligent controls with existing technologies.  
With this perspective, today’s autonomous urban robotics and vehicles 
can be understood to represent the beginning of a long arc of technological 
exploration, development, and proliferation, which may stretch at least as 
long as one can imagine it will take to learn about intelligence.85 If markets 
and institutions permit, people should be able to see the development and 
emergence of more intelligent designs over time, each competing for 
survival. At the moment, entrepreneurship is giving rise to a diversity of 
devices; the presumed standard sizes and uses for vehicles, robotics, and 
drones are being blurred as devices appear to fill in gaps in continua of size, 
shape, and purpose. As technology progresses, new applications should open 
up and individual robotics platforms should be able to operate in multiple 
task domains. In other words, the technology will converge, as devices are 
created to serve multiple or perhaps open-ended purposes across the variety 
                                                                                                                     
83 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529–30 (2015) 
(defining robots). See also Michael Nagenborg, Urban Robotics and Responsible Urban Innovation, 
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9446-8 (defining “urban 
robots” as a term by which to address robots as urban technologies). 
84 Machine learning algorithms allow computers to recognize patterns and make connections that 
are not pre-program, but instead “learned” based on associations in large data sets. As such, they require 
large amounts of data to be effective. See Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ 
(“From the outset, there were two schools of thought regarding how understandable, or explainable, AI 
ought to be. Many thought it made the most sense to build machines that reasoned according to rules and 
logic, making their inner workings transparent to anyone who cared to examine some code. Others felt 
that intelligence would more easily emerge if machines took inspiration from biology, and learned by 
observing and experiencing. This meant turning computer programming on its head. Instead of a 
programmer writing the commands to solve a problem, the program generates its own algorithm based 
on example data and a desired output. The machine-learning techniques that would later evolve into 
today’s most powerful AI systems followed the latter path: the machine essentially programs itself.”). 
For a noted early example, see A. L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of 
Checkers, 3 IBM J. RES. & DEV. 211, 211–29 (1959), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=& 
arnumber=5392560&isnumber=5392559.  
85 See, e.g., M. Mitchell Waldrop, Inside the Moonshot Effort to Finally Figure Out the Brain, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609070/inside-the-moonshot-effort-
to-finally-figure-out-the-brain/ (explaining the future of technological exploration relating to the brain).  
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of public and private spaces.86 This convergence could lead to the creation 
of open robotics platforms, which could drive further innovation.87  
The evolution of technology is an endogenous source of economic 
development, evidenced as new products emerge and flourish in urban 
markets.88 In economics, the notion that technology contributes to growth 
dates back to Adam Smith, with the idea that trade in surplus products may 
be reinvested in technology and shift the division of labor to result in more 
productivity and thus more surplus for trade in a virtuous cycle of economic 
growth.89 Technology is appealing to city officials because of the promise 
of economic growth that it may bring. The function of economic 
development for local government is practically synonymous with attracting 
businesses with new or established technologies, in the hope that the firms 
will build or expand facilities in the government’s jurisdiction. Competitions 
to attract tech firms demonstrate that cities and states will gamble with 
significant amounts of tax dollars in the hope that jobs and technological 
advancement will expand opportunities for local residents.90 
Artificial intelligence assigns, however, a new purpose to technology 
because it allows technology to replace as well as augment the forces of 
nature.91 While technological change is a source of endogenous economic 
development, it brings with it the force in economic theory characterized as 
                                                                                                                     
86 See Siddhartha Menon, Policy Initiative Dilemmas Surrounding Media Convergence: A Cross 
National Perspective, 24 PROMETHEUS 59, 60 (2007) (defining technological convergence in terms of 
the integration or combination and transformation of infrastructures and media, and digitalization).  
87 See Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 574 (2011) (“Open robotics . . . could lead 
to rapid innovation and growth within the personal robotics sector . . . .”). 
88 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO 
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 63 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 8th prtg. 1968) (1934) (“By ‘development,’ therefore, we shall understand only such changes 
in economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within.”); id. 
at 65 (“It is . . . the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by 
him if necessary; they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect 
or other from those which they have been in the habit of using.”); ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 19–20 
(“Schumpeter was asking whether an economy could change itself without external factors—purely from 
within—and if so how” and “realized that there was ‘a source of energy within the economic system 
which would of itself disrupt any [economic market] equilibrium that might be attained’ . . . . The 
economy continually created the new by combining the old, and in doing so it disrupted itself constantly 
from within.”).   
89 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 17, 
22–23 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1799). 
90 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26 (describing Pittsburgh’s “gamble” with attracting Uber’s driverless 
cars); Cecilia Kang, Pittsburgh Welcomed Uber’s Driverless Car Experiment. Not Anymore, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/technology/pittsburgh-ubers-driverless-car-
experiment.html (explaining the deteriorating relationship between Pittsburgh and Uber). 
91 See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 215 (“If we merely used nature’s phenomena in raw form, to power 
water wheels or propel sailing ships, we would feel more at home with technology . . . . But now, with 
the coming of genetic engineering, machine intelligence, bionics, climate engineering, we are beginning 
to use technology—use nature—to intervene directly within nature.”). 
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creative destruction, in which new products disrupt existing markets.92 
When technology attempts to replicate the functions of the brain, as in the 
autonomous control of an automobile, mobile robot, or drone, this 
technology can be designed for the purpose of replacing people.93 Thus the 
creation of new technology can result in the development of new markets, 
but also the destruction of existing ones, disrupting current pathways for the 
creation of wealth in the economy. As the scale of autonomous technology 
expands, as it is likely to do, such disruptions have the potential to change 
the structure of the economy for whole industries. 
Borrowing from Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, 
technologies may be said to compete for survival, but there are limits to this 
analogy.94 What theories of natural and technological evolution share is 
attention to design over time. Their differences, curiously, are based on 
whether one can credibly say that evolution is due to intelligent design. 
Evolution in nature occurs by the process of natural selection, in which 
design consists of the traits of individuals, passed down to or emergent in 
offspring, as may happen over time within the resources and constraints of 
the environment.95 Though people have advocated for a theory of evolution 
that attributes the origin and abundance of variety in nature to design by an 
intelligent being, this concept is not applicable to the natural world.96 Natural 
                                                                                                                     
92 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83–84 (3d ed. 1950) (“The 
opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop 
and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may 
use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the 
essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got 
to live in. . . . Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background 
of that process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of 
creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it . . . .”). 
93 See Waldrop, supra note 85 (“AI is only loosely modeled on the brain. So what if you wanted to 
do it right? You’d need to do what has been impossible until now: map what actually happens in neurons 
and nerve fibers.”). 
94 See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 103 (“The process of problem solving in engineering brings forth 
novel solutions—novel combinations—in an abrupt way that does not match Darwin’s slow cumulation 
of changes. Then from these, the better ones are selected, and then propagate through engineering 
practice, a la Darwin. . . . [T]his . . . does not mean that in technology the best—or fittest—solutions 
always survive. . . . [By] [s]mall chance events, [technologies gain prevalence and] technologies (or 
solutions) that gain prevalence tend to gain further advantage and to lock in, so there is a positive 
feedback process at work in the ‘selection’ of technologies.”). 
95 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 399 (new ed. 1864) (“[T]his whole volume is 
one long argument . . . [advancing] the theory of descent with modification through natural selection . . . 
.”). 
96 DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA 46, 75–76 (1995) (“[A]lthough Darwin 
depended on his idea of the mechanism of natural selection to inspire and guide his research on evolution, 
the end result reversed the order of dependence: he showed so convincingly that species had to have 
evolved that he could then turn around and use this fact to support his more radical idea, natural selection. 
. . . For over a century, skeptics have been trying to find a proof that Darwin’s idea just can’t work, at 
least not all the way. They have been hoping for, hunting for, praying for . . . a ‘mind first’ force or power 
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selection is a process which begets design, but has no designer.97 It has 
resulted in intelligence, but it is not intelligent. Intelligent design is, 
however, a useful concept for understanding the theory of the evolution of 
technology.98 Technology requires designers, and intelligent design, while 
in the eye of the beholder, is a description that becomes apt as a product 
competes in an economic market and survives. 
C. The Intelligent Design of Urban Robotics 
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the factors that lead 
firms to seek out testbeds within cities and the basic stages of design. If cities 
are to be urban testbeds for robots, city officials and their residents should 
become familiar with the process of design because, whether they realize it 
or not, they are participating in it.  
The design of an autonomous system is a complex process, and one that 
cannot be optimized in the abstract. Designing an autonomous system 
requires an understanding of the task for the device and the environment in 
which it must reside. Design is a process of making trade-offs: between 
mobility, sensing, intelligence, cost, and much more. A roboticist must first 
understand the design specifications and parameters in which the system will 
operate. Further, robots operate within an ecology; a complex system where 
changes to one part may impact the whole in unintended ways.  
Cities are not the easiest of environments for roboticists to contemplate 
in design. The simplest environments for robots are factory floors, which are 
typically engineered in ways that reduce the scope of the task the robot must 
undertake. The most complex environment for an autonomous system to 
                                                                                                                     
or process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent design, is ultimately the result of a 
mindless, motiveless mechanicity.”). For a current account of empirical evidence of evolution by natural 
selection, see JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME 
(1994). 
97 DENNETT, supra note 96, at 59, 65 (“Darwin’s dangerous idea: the algorithmic level is the level 
that best accounts for the speed of the antelope, the wing of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity 
of species, and all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature. . . . Can [the actual biosphere] 
be the outcome of nothing but a cascade of algorithmic processes feeding on chance? And if so, who 
designed that cascade? Nobody. It is itself the product of a blind, algorithmic process. . . . Darwin 
suggests a division: Give me Order, he says, and time, and I will give you Design. Let me start with 
regularity—the mere purposeless, mindless, pointless regularity of physics—and I will show you a 
process that eventually will yield products that exhibit not just regularity but purposive design.”). 
98 ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 129. Consider the role of the designer in answering “the key question 
[in evolution] of how novel technologies arise.” Arthur notes that “[t]he mechanism is certainly not 
Darwinian; novel species do not arise from the accumulation of small changes. They arise from a process, 
a human and often lengthy one, of linking a need with a principle (some generic use of an effect) that 
will satisfy it.” Id. “[D]evelopers borrow freely from that many available solutions and select some for 
their designs. This is where Darwinian variation and selection really come in, in technology. The many 
versions of a technology improve in small steps by the selection of better solutions to their internal design 
problems.” Id. at 132. “In technology, combinatorial evolution is foremost, and routine. Darwinian 
variation and selection are by no means absent, but they follow behind, working on structures already 
formed.” Id. at 188. 
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operate in is the natural environment, which is characterized by uncertainty 
and lack of structure. The urban environment falls somewhere in between, 
where considerable structure has been put in place already for humans to 
navigate. Urban roadways in the United States are already highly engineered 
for human use, with design standards for pavement, curb cuts, sidewalks, 
crosswalks, auto lanes, parking, bike lanes, street signs, and so on, which 
have either shaped or been shaped by existing cultural conventions of 
behavior in public space, such as passing on the left and signaling a turn. To 
follow in the path already established by existing modes of transport in 
public rights-of-way is a fairly obvious economical approach to urban 
robotic design. 
The notion of robots operating in an ecology manifests in an inverse 
relationship between the intelligence of the robot and investments made in 
the environment to assist the robot in carrying out its intended tasks. As 
autonomous systems perceive the world quite differently than humans do, 
forcing robots to rely entirely on cues that are embedded in the environment 
for people makes the task for the designer more difficult. Cities simplify the 
design process when they create controlled spaces or stable task 
environments where autonomous systems can operate freely and safely. In 
some domains, such as supermarkets, barcodes, radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) tags, and the like have been embedded in the 
environment to simplify navigation and identification tasks for autonomous 
agents. Ultimately, though, these products are not operating in their intended 
markets until they are active in public space. Thus, one pressing question 
autonomous system designers have for city decision-makers is how much 
information will be embedded in the urban infrastructure and not simply the 
autonomous agent.99  
As a practical matter, this means that efforts to embed signals for use by 
robots in urban infrastructure or modify the allocation or design of urban 
space to accommodate autonomous systems will simplify the effort required 
by the roboticist.100 Some policy commentators, mainly stakeholders in 
automated vehicles, have advocated that cities update or change their 
infrastructure to speed the adoption and testing of robots. The installation of 
advanced sensors to create smart streets or smart intersections, characterized 
                                                                                                                     
99 See TECH POLICY LAB UNIV. OF WASH., DRIVERLESS SEATTLE: HOW CITIES CAN PLAN FOR 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES 12–13 (2017), http://techpolicylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TPL_ 
Driverless-Seattle_2017.pdf (explaining the importance of infrastructure itself to AV use).  
100 See Nagenborg, supra note 83 (“Humanoid robots with a similar size and weight to human 
beings may have the advantage of being able to use structures designed for humans. However, any 
deviation from the culturally and materially embedded body norms may result in a disabling environment 
for such machines in much the same way that similar differences would be disabling for humans. Thus, 
a question arises whether we should build cities for robots or robots for cities. The answer to this question 
is likely to be found in a mixed approach, where the built environment will be adopted to enable new 
robotic applications while safeguarding the quality of city life.”). 
 
 
2020] URBAN ROBOTICS 343 
as vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, is one idea.101 The idea is that 
city infrastructure can be updated to communicate with automated vehicles 
to collect and send the data that helps them drive safely.102 The city of 
Atlanta has already begun to implement this, touting the sensors on its 
“smart corridor” for their ability to promote automated vehicles.103 
Similarly, engineering firm Eng proposed a dedicated lane for automated 
vehicles in New York that would allow a fleet of automated vehicles to move 
quickly around the city.104 Graduate students at UC Berkeley have designed 
a similar system for automated vehicles dubbed a Hyperlane.105 From the 
point of view of the roboticist, such investments raise concomitant tradeoffs 
in mobility and sensing, which have impacts on cost and energy efficiency 
for the robot.  
What the inverse relationship between the design of an autonomous 
system and its environment suggests, however, is that simple environments 
and smart infrastructure for designers will not bring about the safest or most 
viable outcomes for urban robots or automated vehicles. The greater the 
complexity of the task environment in which the robot can navigate 
unassisted, the greater the likelihood that the same robotic design will 
perform successfully in the variety of conditions that occur in urban settings. 
In other words, unaltered, chaotic urban environments can give rise to 
smarter autonomous systems. Also, any reliance on embedded technology 
in urban infrastructure will limit the spatial extent of the market for that robot 
and its associated firm.  
In truth, firms may seek out cities regardless of embedded technology in 
infrastructure. Cities provide unique conditions, which firms and their 
roboticists take up as challenges in the process of design.106 New York City 
is considered a particularly attractive automated vehicle testing location 
because of its narrow streets and dense pedestrian population.107 San 
                                                                                                                     
101 See Adam Theier & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and 
Driverless Cars, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Thierer-
Intelligent-Vehicles.pdf (describing smart infrastructure).  
102 Michael Hamilton, Cities Should Not Design for Autonomous Vehicles, MKT. URBANISM (Nov. 
13, 2017), http://marketurbanism.com/2017/11/13/cities-should-not-design-for-autonomous-vehicles/.  
103 Holly Beilin, Atlanta Is Betting on a Smart Corridor to Reduce Traffic Jams, VENTURE BEAT 
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/10/11/atlanta-is-betting-on-a-smart-corridor-to-reduce-
traffic-jams/.  
104 Benjamin Schneider, Do Driverless Cars Need Their Own Roads Around Manhattan?, CITYLAB 
(July 26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/07/will-autonomous-vehicles-lead-to-a-
resurgence-of-auto-centric-infrastructure/534804/.  
105 Benjamin Preston, Berkeley Duo’s Plan to Solve Traffic Jams: Hyper-Fast Lanes for Self-
Driving Cars, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/03/self-
driving-cars-high-speed-lane-berkeley-california.  
106 John Markoff, A Guide To Challenges Facing Self-Driving Car Technologists, N.Y. TIMES (June 
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/technology/autonomous-car-technology-
challenges.html. 
107 Andrew J. Hawkins, GM Will Be the First Company to Test Self-Driving Cars in New York City, 
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Francisco also attracts firms with its complex and dense urban environments. 
This density means more interactions between robots and humans, and these 
interactions generate more data with which to train the algorithms that 
control the robots. The population density in cities also provides a greater 
marketplace for services like autonomous vehicle taxis or food delivery, and 
the ability to earn revenue while testing is appealing to firms.  
In order to effectively proceed in the design of an urban robot, corporate 
developers, consumers, and city managers should all be engaged to better 
understand and characterize the available trade space prior to design.108 
Trade space may be described as “the range of possible implementation 
options,” and early evaluation involves brainstorming to identify the full 
range of options.109 The expertise involved includes those with knowledge 
of the various subsystems and existing technological concepts relevant to 
the design of the new autonomous system, plus those with knowledge of the 
environment and the intended users of the system. Just identifying the trade 
space in the fast-paced industry of urban robotics poses challenges because 
the technology is itself a moving target. Designing for today may mean you 
are superseded by those designing for tomorrow, so there is inherent risk in 
the overall enterprise. At this early stage, the purpose of gathering 
information is to understand the risks that the various options bring in terms 
of cost, the need for new development of software or hardware, the ability 
of the system to reliably perform its intended tasks, and the time it may take 
to move to market. This information becomes valuable to designers, who 
then must down-select, or reduce the pool of available options and make 
trade-offs across the subsystems of robotic design, to result in a prototype. 
To ease the integration of consumers and city managers with robotic 
designers, it may be helpful to borrow vocabulary from the video game 
industry, which is known for its reliance on participants from outside the 
firm as designs are given shape, tested, and prepared for commercial release. 
In video game development, the first meaningful milestone for bringing a 
product to market is “alpha.” Alpha is reached when designers have 
                                                                                                                     
VERGE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/17/16488330/gm-cruise-nyc-self-driving-
car-test-cuomo.  
108 The idea that the design of urban technologies should involve societal actors and innovators 
working together is captured in the general idea of “Value-Sensitive Design” by Batya Friedman. Batya 
Friedman, Value-Sensitive Design Interactions, INTERACTIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 16–23. This idea is 
incorporated by reference into Urban Robotics by Michael Nagenborg. Nagenborg, supra note 83. 
109 CONTEMPORARY PLANETARY ROBOTICS: AN APPROACH TOWARD AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS § 
2.5.2.4 (Yang Gao ed., 2016). Explanations of the concept of trade space are perhaps easier to find for 
areas of robotics supported by public funds, such as robotics for space exploration. Zachary James Bailey, 
A Trade Space Model for Robotic Lunar Exploration 19 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/59552. See also Jessica 
Knizhni et al., Robotic Satellite Servicing Trade Space Down-Selection, U. MD. (July 2017), 
https://user.eng.umd.edu/~austin/reports.d/INCOSE2017-JK-MA-CC-Paper.pdf (describing the 
developments of robotic space satellite technologies). 
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completed one of each of the objects, features, and environments to be 
developed in the game with basic functionality (a.k.a. “vertical slice”) and 
can thus demonstrate the game to others, begin testing the play of the game 
with a few trusted people outside the firm, and continue making 
modifications, adding features, and building out the remaining copies or 
versions of objects and environments. For urban robots, alpha could be the 
milestone that is reached when a prototype that is designed to carry out pre-
determined tasks is ready for testing in one or more closed or controlled 
environments of the physical world (as opposed to simulated, virtual tests, 
which may also be productive).110  
Once a prototype is developed, the next major milestone is reached when 
all of the features and environmental interactions have been completed and 
are ready for large-scale user feedback, but contain bugs or glitches that have 
to be discovered and fixed. Testing at this phase, known as “closed beta,” is 
often by invitation to a wider audience of persons interested in playing the 
game, but progress for these players in the game is reset or discarded prior 
to commercial release.111 Until recently, firms did not charge players for 
closed beta invitations, but market interest sometimes allows them to do so. 
During closed beta, milestones are set up as hurdles to meet before the game 
can proceed to “open beta,” a form of commercial release in which anyone 
can play and all of the features of monetization are activated. For urban 
robotics, closed beta milestones could involve increasing the complexity of 
the task environments and user testing amongst a wide array of groups, in a 
wide variety of settings. For city managers, closed beta could be a useful 
period in development for gradual expansions of geofenced areas for testing, 
for neighborhoods to opt-in to requests to join the testing environment for a 
given product, and for heightened calls for feedback from residents. 
Commercial release, or launch, finishes the process and allows marketing to 
begin.  
Roboticists have an interest in communicating with governmental 
decision-makers during the beta testing phase because legislation passed 
after a system has been designed can invalidate the initial design 
                                                                                                                     
110 Selected individuals for alpha game testing may be asked to sign non-disclosure agreements to 
protect the interest of the firm, and waivers of liability may also be appropriate for tests in a physical 
environment. 
111 Importantly, reports about Waymo’s recent launch of driverless taxi services, “Waymo One” in 
Pheonix, Arizona, note that beta-testers were contractually prohibited from sharing their experiences, 
and that the same early adopters were retained for the recent launch. See Andrew J. Hawkins, We Spoke 
to a Waymo One Customer About How Robot Taxis Get Confused by Rainstorms, VERGE (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/20/18175563/waymo-one-customer-interview-self-driving-arizona. 
Non-disclosure agreements during closed beta testing would have the effect of eliminating any 
communication between consumers and government and limiting the extent of communication by the 
firm to the government to either information the firm wanted to share or information the government 
required the firm to share. Such limitations, while tempting for the firm, can ultimately slow or restrict 
the potential for a product to serve the public interest. Id. 
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assumptions.112 Participation also creates opportunities for public agencies 
to research the potential effects of rules to govern robots in the public 
interest. For example, should there be a speed limit for robots operating on 
the sidewalk? Should robots or autonomous vehicles ever legally be allowed 
to bump into people? When technology progresses faster than regulatory 
systems, designers build systems for the unknown, which can have the effect 
of raising costs and risks for both the firm and the communities in which its 
products operate. 
Still, many robotic system designers have assumed that they know what 
people want and have moved through the design process without prior 
consultation. This historically has led to the bankruptcy (e.g., Denning 
Mobile Robotics,113 Lily Robotics114) or abandonment of product by 
numerous companies that have created security robots, entertainment 
(iRobot’s “My Real Baby”115), research platforms, and the like. This is also 
what happens when firms adopt strategies that involve asking forgiveness 
rather than permission and purposefully move to market before legal issues 
are settled. This aggressive stance is risky because it may result in harm to 
consumers and local action to ban the product.116 Yet the prospect of being 
a first-mover in a new market, or competing for market share in the early 
years of development, has been known to motivate firms to take this risk.117 
Perhaps it is for this reason that machine learning pioneer Andrew Ng has 
suggested that “[r]ather than building AI to solve the pogo stick problem [of 
unknown edge cases causing problems for AI], we should partner with the 
government to ask people to be lawful and considerate. . . . Safety isn’t just 
about the quality of the AI technology.”118 
                                                                                                                     
112 One noteworthy example of this is the FAA restriction on drones that limits their operation to 
the area within the line of sight of the operator and the limits this places on air package delivery for firms 
such as Amazon. 
113 Hans Moravec, Re: The Company Status of Denning Mobile Robotics, Inc., CARNEGIE MELLON 
U.  (1999), https://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/robot.papers/2000/Denning.Mobile. 
Robotics.bankruptcy. 
114 Jessica Pishko, The Drone Company that Fell to Earth, WIRED (July 26, 2017),  
https://www.wired.com/story/the-drone-company-that-fell-to-earth/. 
115 Danny Allen, Creepy: iRobot’s “My Real Baby”, GIZMODO (Aug. 8, 2009), 
https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2009/08/creepy-irobots-my-real-baby/. 
116 Julia Carrie Wong, San Francisco Sours on Rampant Delivery Robots: ‘Not Every Innovation is 
Great’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/10/san-francisco-
delivery-robots-laws. 
117 Matt Simon, San Francisco Just Put the Brakes On Delivery Robots, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-just-put-the-brakes-on-delivery-robots/.  
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II. CITIES AS TESTBEDS FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND ROBOTICS 
This Part of the Article explores the enthusiasm that city decision-
makers and managers have for autonomous vehicles and robotics, and the 
hazards that await cities as sites of experimentation. This Section begins 
with the arguments city officials make in favor of automated systems, 
followed by an overview of the hazards for cities that pertain to the uses and 
physicality of autonomous products and the hazards involved in the 
collection and use of data from these systems. Lastly, an evidence-based, 
comparative institutional economic approach to policymaking is 
recommended, to forestall negative externalities while permitting 
technological change.   
A. The Interest of Cities in Firms and Their Autonomous Products 
City decision-makers that welcome autonomous vehicles and devices 
perceive their efforts through the lens of economic development, job 
creation, and the need to position for a wave of economically beneficial 
technological change and as part of visionary plans for the future in the 
transportation sector. Through the formation of partnerships, the adoption of 
tech-friendly policy, and changes to city information systems and physical 
environments, city decision-makers are extending invitations to firms and 
their products. As the intended markets for these products, cities and their 
decision-makers will be vital to any effort to shape these products and their 
uses in the public interest. 
As cities have formed partnerships with the firms that want to mobilize 
autonomous products, their decision-makers have raised the hope or 
expectation of reciprocal efforts on the part of firms to deliver civic benefits. 
Public reports of Alphabet’s Waymo use in Austin highlight the ability of a 
blind person to achieve mobility by hailing a driverless automobile.119 
Pittsburgh assisted Uber in acquiring a large plot of land and the Mayor and 
Governor fended off state legislation that would have banned autonomous 
vehicles with the expectation that the firm would provide jobs, free rides, 
and further commitments in an application for a high-profile U.S. DOT 
“smart city challenge” grant.120 Boston’s approach, which has included 
testing by nuTonomy, Optimus Ride, and Aptiv, has been framed by the 
                                                                                                                     
119 See, e.g., Ashley Halsey III & Michael Laris, Blind Man Sets Out Alone in Google’s Driverless 
Car, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/blind-
man-sets-out-alone-in-googles-driverless-car/2016/12/13/f523ef42-c13d-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d 
_story.html?noredirect=on (detailing how a blind person successfully drove around Austin, Texas). 
120 See Ashley Gold, How Uber Lost Its Way in the Steel City, POLITICO (May 1, 2017),  
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/01/uber-pittsburgh-city-mayors-237772 (discussing how Uber 
lost its relationship with Pittsburgh); Kang, supra note 26 (describing the anticipated future of the pilot 
project for Uber); Kang, supra note 90 (describing Pittsburgh’s disdain with Uber’s driverless car 
experiment).   
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city’s action plan for transportation, with goals for equity, economic 
opportunity, and climate responsiveness.121 The recipient of the U.S. DOT 
challenge grant, Columbus, Ohio, set the target of reducing infant mortality 
by forty percent by 2020, through the automation of transit in low-income 
neighborhoods.122 
While some benefits can be expected from investments in transportation 
services, the scale of claims associated with autonomous systems has been 
beyond the imaginable. Free rides, expanded employment opportunities, 
services for the disabled, reduced traffic congestion, equities in transit, and 
climate responsiveness are goals of critical importance to cities, but they are 
only likely to be of passing interest to firms in the transportation sector. The 
idea that firms would offer free rides is inimical to the definition of the firm 
as a profit-making entity. The goal of automation is the elimination of jobs: 
obtaining a profit margin from automated transport by eliminating the 
driver.123 Transportation for the disabled is already proving to be a challenge 
for ride-sharing firms, as it will for automated vehicles.124 The promise of 
improved safety is made by firms with a strong incentive to make such 
claims, and it is a promise that has not yet been realized.125 Proposals to use 
                                                                                                                     
121 Autonomous Vehicles: Boston’s Approach, BOSTON.GOV, 
https://www.boston.gov/departments/new-urban-mechanics/autonomous-vehicles-bostons-approach 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019); Go Boston 2030, BOSTON.GOV, https://www.boston.gov/departments/ 
transportation/go-boston-2030 (last visited Aug. 28, 2018); Vision Framework, BOSTON.GOV (Mar. 
2017), https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/document-file-03-2017/go_boston_2030_-_plan_ 
highlights_to_download.pdf (outlining the goals and targets of Boston in 2030). 
122 Laura Bliss, Who Wins When a City Gets Smart?, CITYLAB (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/11/when-a-smart-city-doesnt-have-all-the-
answers/542976/. 
123 See Muller, supra note 34 (“The business model for AVs assumes that by removing the driver, 
the cost per mile falls dramatically, from today’s $2.50 or $3 per mile, to less than $1, unlocking a much 
larger market opportunity.”); Anton Wahlman, Driverless Cars Will Be the Biggest Investment Write-Off 
Ever, THESTREET (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/opinion/driverless-cars-will-be-the-
biggest-investment-write-off-ever-14818507.  
124 Charlie Sorrel, Ride-Hailing Services Like Uber Are Terrible for Disabled People, FAST 
COMPANY (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3052721/ride-hailing-services-like-uber-are-
terrible-for-disabled-people; Joanne Tang, Without Accommodations, Uber and Lyft are Leaving 
Customers with Disabilities at the Curb, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://ggwash.org/view/68138/without-accommodations-uber-and-lyft-are-leaving-customers-with-
disabilities-at-the-curb. 
125 Jack Stewart, Why Tesla’s Autopilot Can’t See a Stopped Firetruck, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-autopilot-why-crash-radar/. From the Tesla car manual,  
Traffic-Aware Cruise Control cannot detect all objects and may not brake/decelerate 
for stationary vehicles, especially in situations when you are driving over 50 mph (80 
km/h) and a vehicle you are following moves out of your driving path and a stationary 
vehicle or object is in front of you instead.  
Similarly, the author explains, based on language in the car manual, a Volvo “won’t brake to avoid hitting 
a stopped car that suddenly appears up ahead. It might even accelerate towards it.” Aarian Marshall, The 
Maddening Struggle to Make Robo-Cars Safe—and Prove It, WIRED (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/zoox-self-driving-cars-safety/ (“‘Most of what I’d heard in press and at 
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automated vehicles to address equity issues may also be the product of 
wishful thinking: cities of the United States have underinvested in transit 
and related transportation infrastructure for decades, with noticeable impacts 
to equity.126 The widely touted notion that artificially intelligent vehicles and 
devices can eliminate traffic congestion, while freeing up the vast acreage 
of asphalt and concrete currently devoted to parking, is ludicrous. The 
simple math of public space allocation and single occupancy vehicles does 
not add up in favor of these claims.127 Instead, current economic incentives 
motivate firms to send empty vehicles to cruise in search of free parking.128 
In regard to climate change, the transportation sector is responsible for about 
one third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, giving the U.S. government the 
burden of investing in or overseeing the electrification of the transportation 
system, with concurrent investments in carbon neutral energy sources.129 
How could people possibly believe that automated vehicles will reduce 
emissions, when the fleets licensed for automated driving continue to use 
fossil fuels? The public good and current designs, composition, or 
envisioned uses of automated vehicles and robotics are not aligned, and the 
effects of their deployment, for better or worse, are going to be experienced 
locally. In the face of unrealistic claims of benefits from firms, cities must 
become critical forces in the effort to shape these products and their uses for 
public good. 
Perhaps the strongest rationale for recognizing the role of cities in 
shaping urban robotic markets is the fact that the built environment, and its 
associated economic conditions, are subject to local control. The choice of 
whether to allow and financially support changes to urban physical 
infrastructure to accommodate autonomous systems is almost entirely local, 
                                                                                                                     
events with autonomous vehicle people was political rhetoric: “We won’t hurt anybody; this will be safer 
than a person.” But there is no engineering to back that up,’ says Stefan Seltz-Axmacher, CEO and 
cofounder of robotic truck startup Starsky Robotics.”).  
126 Junfeng Jiao & Chris Bischak, People Are Stranded in ‘Transit Deserts’ in Dozens of U.S. Cities, 
CONVERSATION (Mar. 13, 2018), http://theconversation.com/people-are-stranded-in-transit-deserts-in-
dozens-of-us-cities-92722. 
127 See NACTO, supra note 5, at 11 (“This future is not guaranteed—and history shows we could 
easily end up with the opposite. Traffic and emissions could skyrocket, ‘roboroutes’—walls of 
autonomous vehicles with few gaps—could divide communities, people could be relegated to 
inconvenient and unpleasant pedestrian bridges, and high-priced, inequitable mobility could supplant 
transit.”). See also Allison Arieff, Automated Vehicles Can’t Save Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/27/opinion/automated-vehicles-cant-save-cities.html 
(debunking the common promises that proponents of autonomous vehicles make regarding how these 
vehicles will improve city life). 
128 Adam Millard-Ball, “The Autonomous Vehicle Parking Problem”, 75 TRANSP. POL’Y 105, 99–
108 (2019), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2019.01.003. 
129 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“In 
2017, greenhouse gas emissions from transportation accounted for about 28.9 percent of total U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, making it the largest contributor of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
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in that state departments of transportation tend to have responsibility only 
for state and national highways. Even for drones, the Federal Aviation 
Administration regulates airspace, but changes to the local urban 
infrastructure to accommodate delivery or “follow me” drones will be 
almost entirely up to local governments and the physical environments that 
they own or regulate. This means that city managers and decision-makers 
are likely to experience pressure from firms to modify the allocation of 
public space, environmental design, pricing, and associated local public 
revenues and expenditures, regardless of state and federal legislation. For 
example, online magazine Quartz reported that in negotiations with the city 
of Pittsburgh, Uber wanted the city to grant non-exclusive access to bus 
lanes and municipal parking lots to use as staging areas.130 These demands 
contributed to the breakdown in the working relationship between Uber and 
the city.131 Relatedly, other groups have advocated that cities reduce parking 
space to promote automated vehicles, though the economics of the situation 
simply look like increased demand for curbside use, and parking is often an 
important source of municipal revenue.132 Accidents can also take their toll 
on cities: even though an Uber automated vehicle failed to brake, killing a 
pedestrian, and the relatives settled with Uber, the relatives have also filed a 
$10 million claim against the city of Tempe, Arizona, saying that the city 
was in part responsible for the accident because of a faulty street design.133 
City officials may capitulate, designing streets in favor of the interests of 
firms and dedicating rights-of-way to automated vehicles, resulting in a loss 
of public rights to the street in favor of automated fleets of vehicles and 
robots.134 Cities are, however, comprised of people who vote, and as 
                                                                                                                     
130 See Alison Griswold, Uber Asked a Lot of Pittsburgh for Its Self-Driving Cars, and Offered Back 
Very Little, QUARTZ (Dec. 29, 2016), https://qz.com/874548/uber-asked-a-lot-of-pittsburgh-for-its-self-
driving-cars-and-offered-back-very-little/ (describing a list of “smart infrastructure upgrade” proposals 
suggested by Uber).  
131 See id. (“Pittsburgh didn’t win the Smart City Challenge but neither did Austin; the prize went 
to Columbus, Ohio, in June. The city did not reach any agreements with Uber on infrastructure upgrades 
or routes, a spokesman for the mayor’s office told Quartz.”). 
132 See SHARED MOBILITY PRINCIPLES FOR LIVABLE CITIES, 
https://www.sharedmobilityprinciples.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“Transportation and land use 
planning and policies should minimize the street and parking space used per person and maximize the 
use of each vehicle. We discourage overbuilding and oversized vehicles and infrastructure, as well as the 
oversupply of parking.”). 
133 See Bernie Woodall, Uber Avoids Legal Battle With Family of Autonomous Vehicle Victim, 
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-uber-settlement/uber-
avoids-legal-battle-with-family-of-autonomous-vehicle-victim-idUSKBN1H5092 (explaining the 
circumstances surrounding the settlement between the family of a woman killed by a self-driving vehicle 
and Uber). See also Associated Press, Relatives of Woman Killed in Self-Driving Uber Crash File $10M 
Claim, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/relatives-woman-killed-
self-driving-uber-crash-file-10m-claim-n966971 (stating that the previously undisclosed claim filed last 
fall against the City of Tempe sought five million dollars each for the husband and daughter of the woman 
killed by Uber’s autonomous vehicle). 
134 See Ian Bogost, Will Robocars Kick Humans Off of City Streets?, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2016), 
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enthusiastic as city decision-makers and managers may be for firms with 
autonomous products, they still need to represent the interest of local 
residents and taxpayers, and this places them in a position to negotiate with 
firms on behalf of the general public. 
As stewards of the public good, city managers and decision-makers care 
about efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the provision of essential goods 
and services, as well as the effects of the choices they make on jobs and the 
economy. Publications from the National Association of City Transportation 
Officials (with membership from fifty-two cities across the United States) 
and the Regional Plan Association (serving the New York metropolitan area) 
urge city managers to brace against the potentially disruptive effects of 
automated vehicles, for example, by engaging in proactive policymaking to 
ensure that “public benefit guides private action,” to “shape how [automated 
vehicles] interact with transit,” and to “prioritize street space for public 
transit, pedestrians, bikes, and freight.”135 Several of these choices are 
exhibited today in the attempts of ride-sharing firms to partner with local 
governments and transit agencies, for example, for subsidized first and last 
mile passenger delivery to remote transit stations.136 Guidelines for city 
officials break down the components and possible effects of autonomous 
vehicles into modules and provide schema for the gradual, sequential 
alteration of the design and allocation of public space.137 Highlighting the 
disruptive effects of artificially intelligent transportation, the Regional Plan 
Association also suggests that plans get underway to determine how to 
transition the 220,000 or so persons in vulnerable positions in the region to 
new forms of employment.138  
For the public good, cities are also interested in the information that 
firms collect through these technologies. City officials have a general need 
to govern the flow of information for accountability, transparency, and 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/robocars-only/488129/ (“It’s not hard to 
imagine a near future in which municipalities like Altamonte Springs might use the cost savings (or direct 
investment) of companies like Uber, Lyft, or Google to invest in much-needed maintenance and updates. 
Once cars become autonomous, the benefit of investments like these will increase even further, since the 
cost and liability of human drivers can be averted. Better roads mean lower maintenance costs.”). 
135 See NACTO, supra note 5, at 13–14 (listing “public benefit guides private action” as one of six 
principles for autonomous urbanism). 
136 See Mobility on Demand (MOD) Sandbox Program, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., 
https://www.transit.dot.gov/research-innovation/mobility-demand-mod-sandbox-program.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the Mobility on Demand Sandbox Program). 
137 See NACTO, supra note 5, at 16–17 (detailing critical steps that NACTO cities have already 
adopted and are implementing to prepare for the autonomous future). 
138 See New Mobility: Autonomous Vehicles and the Region, REG’L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 2017), 
http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-New-Mobility-Autonomous-Vehicles-and-the-Region.pdf (“There are 
about 220,000 motor vehicle operators in the RPA region. These occupations, which span the trucking, 
taxi, black car and bus sectors, are among the shrinking number of well-paying jobs that generally do not 
require a college degree. It will be essential that there be pathways into different careers for those workers 
whose jobs are replaced by AVs.”).  
 
 
352 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
privacy; a need which may be heightened by local or state regulations 
regarding privacy and surveillance.139 At the same time, city managers see 
value in gaining access to this data for direct use in balancing demand and 
supply of services and built environments. Historically, transportation 
agencies have had to rely on relatively expensive and time-consuming 
methods to collect data on travel behavior and the use of transport facilities 
because of the lack of integration of information technology in vehicles and 
the fact that autos and trucks are predominantly owned and operated by 
individuals.140 The information technology of transport is already 
undergoing dramatic changes: rideshare, car-share, and bike-share services 
concentrate travel information into the hands of a comparatively small 
number of firms.141 With the adoption of autonomous systems, the industrial 
organization of the entire transport sector is headed for upheaval: 
autonomous controls are likely to result in the concentration of the 
ownership of vehicles as well as information about their uses and users.142 
The ability of public agencies to make smart decisions about the allocation 
and governance of public space will depend on their ability to access and 
merge this information with data on public services and investments.143 If 
disputes between the firms of the sharing economy and cities over access to 
data are indicators of what is to come, there will have to be neutral third 
                                                                                                                     
139 See Saad Bashar, About the Surveillance Ordinance, SEATTLE INFO. TECH., 
https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/surveillance-technologies/about-surveillance-ordinance 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the effect Seattle Surveillance Ordinance 125376 has on city-
owned surveillance technology). 
140 The World Bank Launches New Open Transport Partnership to Improve Transportation 
Through Open Data, WORLD BANK (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2016/12/19/the-world-bank-launches-new-open-transport-partnership-to-improve-
transportation-through-open-data (“[T]raditional methods for collecting traffic data needed to address 
congestion are costly and rely either on labor-intensive field work or capital-intensive sensor data 
networks that far exceed available resources.”). In U.S. cities, labor-intensive traffic counts and travel 
diary surveys as information sources for transportation system decisions have recently been augmented 
by license plate readers, cell phone tracking data, data feeds from Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi sniffers, as cities 
have contracted with private vendors and university researchers to serve this need. Id. 
141 Prominent firms in U.S. markets include Uber and Lyft in rideshare, Reachnow and Car2Go in 
car-share, and Lime, Jump, Spin, and Mobike in dockless bike-share markets, plus numerous firms in 
scooter markets, all of which collect information on travelers from a combination of their mobile apps 
and the GPS and related technologies installed in the cars, bikes, and scooters. 
142 See Self-Driving Cars Will Require New Business Models, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/01/self-driving-cars-will-require-new-business-
models (“It is likely to be many years before AVs are cheap enough for individuals to buy them, and 
capable enough to operate outside predefined, geofenced areas. Meanwhile, the roll-out of cheap 
robotaxis in urban areas might encourage many young urbanites, who are already going off car ownership 
anyway, to abandon it altogether. The combination of ride-hailing and autonomous-driving technology 
confronts carmakers with ‘the most profound challenge to their business models in a century,’ declares 
a recent report from BCG.”). 
143 See NACTO, supra note 5, at 20 (“Billions of detailed street-level data points are collected in 
real time daily on everything from traffic speeds and volumes to travel patterns and transit use. This data 
is vital to the operations and management of streets, regardless of the entity generating them.”). 
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parties to operate trusted data platforms and broker these exchanges.144 
Travel patterns are remarkably unique and sensitive for what they reveal 
about individuals and the actions of the firm, making the data valuable to 
firms inside and outside of the transport market and of great concern to 
officials tasked with protecting the privacy of city residents.145 At the same 
time, government agencies need to use the same data sources to hold firms 
accountable, and the public deserves transparency in the actions of 
government agencies for the same.146 
Cities are critical to the rollout of autonomous systems because, in 
contrast to federal and state governments, the diversity of approaches taken 
by city decision-makers in the adoption of new technologies makes cities 
laboratories for policy, governance, and implementation of enforcement 
mechanisms. Governments are in the business of institutional change; 
institutions are the “formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement 
characteristics” developed and used by the polity and judiciary to govern in 
the public interest.147 In the face of rapid change in technology, it is 
remarkably difficult to determine ex ante the structure and content of 
policies most beneficial to the public. The public interest is, in and of itself, 
a complex phenomenon. Institutional change has historically been led by 
cities and related local and state governments in the bottom-up fashion of a 
federalist system to take advantage of experimentation with a diversity of 
                                                                                                                     
144 See Kevin Schofield, The City – and Public – Get a Win in Court, SCC INSIGHT (June 1, 2018), 
https://sccinsight.com/2018/06/01/the-city-and-the-public-get-a-win-in-court/ (summarizing a recent 
ruling in Washington State Supreme Court in favor of public disclosure of Uber and Lyft data by the City 
of Seattle). See also NACTO, supra note 5, at 21 (“In order to protect user data, an independent third-
party company can sort and anonymize data collected before it is used for analysis, ensuring individual 
users are not identified. Once analyzed, this data can be used to direct city policy and prioritize 
projects.”); Transportation Data Collaborative, URBANALYTICS, 
https://urbanalytics.uw.edu/projects/transportationdatacollab/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“The 
Transportation Data Collaborative (TDC) is an initiative at the UW to create a protected and linked data 
repository of sensitive information from public and private transportation providers. . . . The TDC allows 
partnering agencies to create data-driven policy, support research uses, and provide individuals with 
authenticated access to their own transportation records.”).  
145 See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human 
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP. 1376, 1376 (2013) (“We study fifteen months of human mobility data for one and 
a half million individuals and find that human mobility traces are highly unique. In fact, in a dataset 
where the location of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to that given 
by the carrier’s antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the 
individuals.”). See also NACTO, supra note 5, at 20 (“[I]ntricate information on people movement is 
laden with personally identifiable information that neither government nor private companies should 
have access to.”). 
146 See Muller, supra note 34 (“Investors are betting the real value of AV companies will come 
from the estimated 4 terabytes of data each car will generate per day. And based on the way they’re 
valuing the major AV players, Wall Street seems to think tech companies have a better shot than Detroit 
at capitalizing on that data.”). 
147 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97–98 (1991); Douglass C. North, Prize 
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policies and evaluations of related outcomes before forming more lasting 
federal regulations. At the local level, pilot programs, sunset clauses with 
requirements for audit and program evaluation, and geofencing are 
mainstays of governance—when testing new concepts, technologies, and 
environmental designs in public space—that have the practical purpose of 
supporting evidence-based changes to policy over time. Irrespective of 
technology, the authority city decision-makers have to draw boundaries that 
limit the spatial extent of the market, affix rules to public and private space 
that limit allowed activities, determine required and allowed uses and flows 
of information, develop and enforce pricing schemes, issue or revoke 
operating permits, and tax, audit, charge fees, levy fines, and ban goods 
constitutes critical leverage in the negotiations between firms and city 
governments for the public good. 
In sum, as enthusiastic as they may be, city decision-makers should be 
strategic in their evaluation, adoption, and regulation of autonomous vehicle 
and robotic technologies.148 The benefits of utilizing cities as laboratories 
for policymaking depends on the ability of city managers and 
decision-makers to shape these new markets for the public good and to enter 
these relationships with eyes wide open, on the lookout for unintended as 
well as intended consequences. 
B. The Hazards in Store for Cities as Testbeds of Autonomous Systems 
Cities are appropriate centers of autonomous robotic innovation, but 
they should proceed carefully to avoid treating the associated risks of these 
technologies and partnerships as afterthoughts. The problems that 
accompany autonomous systems in cities could be understood in the same 
terms as the promises associated with these technologies—for safety, 
convenience, equity, emissions, and the economy. Though less prominent in 
the literature, the hazards of these systems also derive from their use of 
sensing and communication technologies, in the form of surveillance and 
associated losses to privacy. 
Safety is the risk that has risen to the forefront of governmental offices 
as they have witnessed the early adoption of autonomous vehicles and 
robotics. The bulk of activities at the federal, state, and local levels, from 
reports and model legislation to the development of testbeds outside as well 
as within public rights-of-way, highlights the importance of safety in the 
design and use of these products.149 Similarly, accounts of accidents in the 
                                                                                                                     
148 New Mobility: Autonomous Vehicles and the Region, REG’L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2017), 
http://www.rpa.org/publication/new-mobility-autonomous-vehicles-and-region; Driverless Seattle, U. 
WASH. TECH POL’Y LAB, http://techpolicylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TPL_Driverless-
Seattle_2017.pdf.  
149 The main issues addressed at the federal and state levels have been enabling legislation and 
safety. See, e.g., Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
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news have raised public and private concern over the continuing role of the 
human behind the wheel or with hands on the controls and the impacts to 
people and property from collisions with autonomous vehicles, robots, and 
drones.150 The first accident involving the death of a pedestrian from an 
automated vehicle shocked many advocates of the technology.151 Such 
anecdotes appear to have temporarily pierced the popular notion that 
autonomous systems will eliminate death and injury. The idea that 
autonomous controls will eliminate injury is unrealistic because, like all 
complex technological systems, artificially intelligent autonomous controls 
are never completely understood, even by those that design the system.152 
The complexity and processing power of autonomous controls are expected 
to increase over time as the systems are trained to operate within complex 
environments.153 But, because of the tendency designers have to add 
responsibilities to these systems as quickly as possible, there are some in the 
field who caution that it may be impossible to create a truly safe autonomous 
system.154  
Public pronouncements that autonomous systems will usher in an 
unprecedented era of convenience contrast with early evaluations of 
autonomous vehicles that show, in the context of the holistic use of urban 
public space, that the vehicles are not as cost-effective as existing 
alternatives. Most of the firms engaged in trials of autonomous vehicles are 
using cars that would carry three or fewer occupants.155 Recent studies of the 
                                                                                                                     
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-
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150 See Megan Geuss, Drone Crashes in Arizona National Forest, Starts a Wildfire, ARS TECHNICA 
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/03/drone-crashes-in-arizona-national-forest-
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151 See Wren, supra note 6 (discussing first incident of pedestrian struck and killed by self-driving 
car in Arizona and how the government investigators linked an “overreliance on vehicle automation” to 
the crash). 
152 Arend Hintze, I Am an AI Researcher. This Is What Keeps Me Up at Night, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a14537028/i-am-
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153 See Wilko Schwarting et al., Planning and Decision-Making for Autonomous Vehicles, 1 ANN. 
REV. CONTROL, ROBOTICS, & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 187, 203 (2018) (“Autonomous systems still need 
to reach human-level reliability in decision-making, planning, and perception, and current detection and 
segmentation accuracies do not yet suffice in difficult conditions . . . .”). 
154 E.g., Hintze, supra note 152 (discussing fears regarding AI technology from the perspective of 
an AI developer). 
155 Economy cars, sedans, and SUVs are the norm for Waymo, Uber, and most automobile 
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impact of autonomous vehicles on traffic in downtown Boston, with 
associated simulations to model preferences for mode choice, show a fifteen 
percent reduction of vehicles on the road, coupled with a sixteen percent 
increase in vehicle miles traveled, resulting in only a four percent 
improvement in travel time in general and a five percent increase in travel 
time and associated congestion in the downtown area.156 As improvements, 
these impacts fall short of traditional investments in bus and rail transit 
services and underscore the importance of transitioning from single 
occupancy vehicles to pooled ridership and renewed investment in transit.157 
Otherwise, the influx of autonomous services, in the form of vehicles and 
robots, would be predicted to increase congestion and cause more of a 
nuisance than a convenience.  
Autonomous vehicles and robotics can only be expected to make cities 
more equitable if they are accessible to all at affordable rates. The firms 
participating in these markets are like any other firms in that they will reach 
a point in time when the profitability of autonomous services matters.158 As 
they strive for profitability, firms can be expected to care about pricing, 
market share, participation in two-sided markets, their ability to influence 
the adoption of rules and regulations that stave off competition, and 
safeguarding their financial self-interest. The moves of firms in these areas 
can also be expected to be regressive—having a disproportionate impact on 
those who have relatively little ability to pay for transportation services, such 
as those who are in vulnerable, low-wage jobs.159 These economic 
conditions are not going to change with autonomous systems. Reading the 
media today, it would be easy to assume that the free or low-priced services 
                                                                                                                     
companies in this sector. See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Return to Public Roads for 
the First Time Since Fatal Crash, VERGE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/ 
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driving tests with Volvo SUVs). 
156 Bos. Consulting Grp., How Autonomous Vehicles Affect City Traffic, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMZIEBoR49U [hereinafter BCG Study]. 
157 See Patrick Sisson, Sick of Traffic? Get Cities to Invest in Bikes and Mass Transit, Says Report, 
CURBED (June 11, 2019), https://www.curbed.com/2019/6/11/18661586/bike-train-traffic-
transportation-congestion (citing reports indicating that congestion adds, on average, forty-one percent 
more time to the average commute and recommending solutions such as investment in optimized traffic 
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158 Tech firms benefit in early development and market expansion from venture capital and other 
types of investment for revenue. See Kate Conger, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are Valued at $7.25 Billion 
by Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/technology/uber-atg-
autonomous-cars-investment.html (discussing Uber’s profitability and its business model surrounding its 
self-driving car technology). 
159 See Hana Creger et al., Autonomous Vehicle Heaven or Hell? Creating a Transportation 
Revolution that Benefits All, GREENLINING INST. (Jan. 2019), http://greenlining.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/R4_AutonomousVehiclesReportSingle_2019_2.pdf (discussing the “hell” 
created by personal autonomous vehicles, including environmental concerns, increased economic 
inequality, outpacing regulations, and congestion, and providing recommendations to make the 
autonomous vehicle revolution beneficial for all, not just higher-income individuals).  
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that accompany the initial rollout of products to market would continue into 
the future because it is tempting to think that firms will pass on the cost 
savings that come from automated fleet services to customers. To assume so 
would be naive. The need for free and reduced-price services and the 
requirements of service-area coverage enforced today by transit and 
transportation agencies will not disappear with new technologies. The 
equitable pricing of and access to transportation services will continue to be 
of critical importance for policymakers in the era of autonomous systems. 
Emissions will only be reduced by autonomous vehicles and robotic 
systems if the sources of energy used to power them are less carbon intensive 
than the current fuel mix. Environmental and political pressure to convert 
from fossil fuel sources to electricity are transforming the auto industry at 
the same time that automakers are partnering en masse with information 
technology firms to adopt autonomous control systems.160 The conversion 
to electric energy is also leading automakers to search for opportunities to 
lock in new sources of revenue, such as long-term concession agreements 
that would place firms in the position of controlling the access price of public 
parking spaces in exchange for capital investment in electric charging 
stations.161 Altogether, the combined forces of automation and electrification 
may upend the industrial organization of the transportation industry, 
transforming what has been a highly disaggregated ownership structure 
based on private, personally-held assets into a highly concentrated 
ownership of fleets and firms with ownership in search of preferential or 
exclusive rights to currently public rights-of-way. 
Amongst policymakers, the most pressing concern about urban robotics 
is likely to be the question of whether they will bring about economic and 
associated financial improvements to the cities responsible for the 
infrastructure that these systems rely on. Early reports already suggest that 
public parking, which is one of the most important sources of revenue for 
cities in the transportation sector, may be under threat by autonomous 
                                                                                                                     
160 See, e.g., Reese Counts, Toyota, VW and GM Partner on Autonomous Vehicle Education, 
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systems. Results from last year’s simulation of the effect of autonomous 
vehicles on Boston’s parking system show a reduction in demand for parking 
by forty-eight percent.162 At the same time, cities can expect pressure from 
firms to invest more in public rights-of-way, by either embedding 
technologies in infrastructure or redesigning and constructing built 
environments to favor their products, and to provide preferential or exclusive 
allocations of public space for their private use.163 In general, such efforts 
should be recognized as attempts to pass on the private cost of adopting these 
technologies to the public taxpayer and, with that, to society. 
That said, perhaps the least appreciated of the hazards from urban 
robotics are the acute risks they bring to city residents of increased 
surveillance and loss of privacy. Urban robots have sensing and computing 
capabilities that enable them to collect and process information in public 
spaces on a potentially massive scale, challenging existing information 
privacy governance frameworks.164 Furthermore, they may combine 
mobility with capacity to identify individuals or group members, raising the 
prospect of their use within and across spaces to target and pursue persons—
an invasion of privacy that is without parallel in smart city technology. And, 
as in other data rich sectors, firms can be expected to take advantage of every 
opportunity to collect and monetize data about people, whether those people 
opted in to said collection and uses. Market analysts in the automated vehicle 
sector are already anticipating the opportunity for firms to add value by 
monetizing data on secondary markets, as evidenced in the differential 
valuations given to the information technology firms in comparison to the 
automotive firms.165 Whether firms should be allowed to do so or not is 
something that should matter to city officials because of the long-term 
impact this choice creates for public life. 
By combining the basic functionality of Internet of Things (IoT) devices 
with mobility for urban robots, including autonomous vehicles, the 
evolution of technology is bringing about an unprecedented risk to privacy 
in the public environment of city streets. A robot is essentially a mobile 
computing platform that senses and operates in the physical world and can 
therefore be conceptualized as a type of IoT application.166 IoT devices can 
                                                                                                                     
162 BCG Study, supra note 156. 
163 See Gold, supra note 120 (discussing Pittsburgh lawmakers’ frustrations with Uber’s 
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be deployed to surveil locations and situations with near perfect recall. For 
example, many cities have or plan to install cameras on streetlights that can 
observe and record the public space under its purview.167 Unlike a human 
observer, it will never tire and can record for as long as it has storage 
capacity and a power source. These recording capabilities can be combined 
with facial recognition and other AI-powered processing tools that could, for 
instance, query police databases in real time.168 They may be employed by 
governments or private companies, often in cooperation with one another. 
Furthermore, traditional privacy controls like notice and choice become 
more difficult to execute with respect to IoT devices; this is because IoT 
devices often lack an interface through which to communicate information 
about privacy practices to the subjects of data collection.169 Even where 
devices or their operators can provide notice to data subjects, those 
individuals may lack meaningful choice about being recorded.170 A person 
can choose not to use Facebook if they do not agree with the company’s data 
practices, but they cannot opt out of being recorded by IoT devices on city 
streets without effectively retreating from public life.171  
C. How Cities Can Prepare to Be Sites of Experimentation 
This Paper argues that cities should be given the authority and flexibility 
to experiment with autonomous vehicles and robotics and that city managers 
and decision-makers should prepare to participate in the testing process with 
the designers of artificially intelligent systems. This Section provides an 
overview of the task that lies ahead for cities, and it highlights perspectives 
and methods useful for evaluating the effects of policy choices in the public 
interest. 
From an institutional economic perspective, cities as sites of 
experimentation need to recognize and harness their ability to act as market 
makers. Governments create the rules of the game for private firms. In times 
of institutional change, governments can act in the public interest by 
orienting policymaking toward the purposes of minimizing social harm, 
                                                                                                                     
167 See Sarah Holder, The Shadowy Side of LED Street Lights, CITYLAB (Mar. 8, 2018), 
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internalizing externalities, and preventing the transfer of private costs to 
society.172 When considering the many facets of change accompanying 
autonomous vehicles and technologies, focus should move to 
evidence-based policy and evaluations that compare the costs to firms and 
the public of existing and new technologies as they occur under various 
institutional arrangements. 
City managers and decision-makers will need support for sophisticated 
negotiations in the domain of automated vehicles and robotics. Policies, 
procedures, regulations, and enforcement implicated in governing these 
technologies span the boundaries of the transportation and information 
technology sectors as we understand them today. It is perhaps for these 
reasons that several cities have formed interdisciplinary working groups to 
focus on becoming testbeds for autonomous vehicles. These include 
partnerships with outside organizations, some of which appear to be unique 
in the history of the sector. One of these is Boston’s multi-year partnership 
with Boston Consulting Group and the World Economic Forum, which—in 
the first of several reports—affirms that cities should work cooperatively 
with state and federal agencies but argues that cities should be in “the lead 
in establishing a governance structure and testing policy and parameters to 
foster innovative solutions to their most pressing transportation 
challenges.”173 
Support can be especially helpful if it can be interdisciplinary because it 
provides a clearer picture of the implications of various policy options. At 
times like this—when the adoption of policy can actually reshape the entire 
industrial organization of a sector of critical infrastructure—it pays to place 
policy debates in economic and social terms. When political arguments have 
economic motivations, it is particularly important to know the economic 
implications of their adoption in law and policy. Arguments for the freedom 
to innovate may have ideological merit, but the practical implications for 
policy change are usually about the reallocation of property rights across the 
public and private sectors for economic or financial gain. These reallocations 
have the effect of determining, inter alia, the factors and associated costs 
that will be internal to markets and therefore borne by firms and established 
in the pricing of goods and services on the market and the factors and 
associated costs that will be externalized and thus borne by public agencies, 
the taxpayers that fund them, and society in general. 
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Furthermore, the methodologies used to reveal these relationships 
matter. Simple cost-benefit analyses, commonly recommended in the 
analysis of public expenditures, are not appropriate when the alternatives to 
be evaluated serve differing policy goals. More promising analyses are 
possible if—borrowing somewhat from research methodologies in 
institutional and transaction cost economics—the economic effects of policy 
options are examined holistically: by examining the trade-offs experienced 
by the various public and private parties involved in delivering and receiving 
services, while keeping in mind current and potential future industrial 
organizations of the sector.174 In all cases, it is important to understand the 
comparative effects of current and proposed policy options with respect to 
the distribution of both production and transaction costs across the parties 
involved in delivering, governing, and consuming the products and services. 
The methodologies for examining comparative institutional arrangements 
from transaction cost economics—which break down the delivery of 
services by task, noting which party bears costs, which receives benefits, and 
in what amounts—may be adapted to this purpose.175 
It is also important that research consider the effects that policies may 
have on competition and the resulting impacts if competition in the transport 
sector were to be replaced by concentrated ownership of assets. Competition 
is still the most important force in delivering economic benefits from 
markets, but the extent to which society reaps these benefits and maintains 
competition also depends on the institutions that govern the sector. 
Historically, the private ownership of mobile assets and public investment 
in networks—operated as a non-excludable asset—have assisted this sector 
in avoiding several market failures that are more visibly acute in, for 
example, the communication sector’s struggle over net neutrality or 
rent-seeking behavior on the part of organizations that own the transmission 
systems needed to wheel water from one community to another. Policies that 
preserve equal access to essential infrastructure (such as the underlying 
network of roads, parking, conduit, utility poles, curbs, and gutters) and 
resist the urge to privatize public space on transportation and related 
communication networks have the economic effects of keeping this space in 
play for all parties and keeping barriers low for competitors seeking entry to 
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the market with mobile assets. Privatization of public space and policies that 
offer preferred or exclusive access have the opposite effect: they lock public 
entities into monopoly or oligopoly relations in the provision of services and 
thus carry the potential for multiple downstream hazards, such as disputes 
over pricing, quality of service, and a host of opportunity costs that 
accompany the privatization of public assets.176 
Guidance from the National Association of City Transportation 
Officials and the Regional Plan Association of New York suggests that cities 
create public-facing, proactive strategies for exploring, testing, permitting, 
and supporting autonomous vehicles.177 The same guidance should be 
extended to include urban robotics and drones. City strategies should be 
designed to assist decision-makers in understanding the strengths and 
limitations of artificially intelligent products, as well as the prevailing 
business models that firms are relying on as they enter the market. It would 
be important to know, for example, the interests of firms as they seek access 
to the public rights-of-way, the models for pricing goods and services, any 
plans for market and service-area expansion, and the disposition of the data 
the firm collects about the public. These factors are central to the operation 
of firms and happen to coincide with the interests that cities have in crafting 
policies in the public interest. Each city should be prepared to evaluate these 
products and their providers on the merits and the costs to city government 
and city residents. Existing guidance attempts to summarize the values that 
city decision-makers and managers consider important, and, as noted above, 
these considerations are not necessarily aligned with the interests of firms. 
Firms may seek to externalize costs and use data about local residents on 
secondary markets, and cities should avoid this trap. The capacity to evaluate 
policy will matter, as noted in this Section, as will the capacity to evaluate 
the various forms of agreements and contracts that will be instrumental in 
preserving public values while adopting these new technologies. 
In their efforts, city managers should perhaps make a point of explaining 
to the various parties in these new industries that environmental design is 
local, expensive, and extremely consequential. Guidance from the National 
Association of City Transportation Officials and the Regional Plan 
Association makes this point in subtle ways, by emphasizing efficient 
options for intersection design, for example, and laying out a timeline for 
the gradual redesign of urban arterials that surely appears to be slow in 
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comparison to the business plans of firms and their investors.178 From the 
point of view of city management, this slow pace of environmental design 
may be realistic under the most ambitious of timeframes, given how changes 
to the built environment actually proceed. Earthwork, concrete, utility posts, 
and the relocation of utilities—these are the types of modifications that 
people take for granted but are highly significant for their expense and 
opportunity cost in the budget cycle of public agencies. One new sensor or 
communication device on a utility pole will not cost very much, but when 
contemplated at the scale of the transportation system, the cost quickly 
becomes prohibitive for all but the wealthiest of jurisdictions. The 
consequences of alterations to the built environment are of course physical, 
but they are also financial—their financial impact depends on the contractual 
arrangements that made them possible, and they matter to the extent that 
they give rise to new flows of information, impacts to privacy, and 
monetization of data about local residents. Lastly, many legal requirements 
extend from local environmental design, from local speed limits to liabilities 
for safety, nuisance, security, and privacy. 
III. THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVACY AND URBAN 
ROBOTS 
As discussed above, the potential for urban robots to serve as data 
gathering and surveillance tools will challenge existing societal expectations 
of what is “private,” as well as the laws that protect privacy. Urban robots 
will contribute to a trend, already underway, of digital technologies forcing 
changes to the legal frameworks governing personal data. Currently, the law 
gives individuals very little control over their data once it has been disclosed 
to a third party.179 Once an individual’s information has been disclosed to a 
company—for instance, on a social media platform like Facebook—the 
company can analyze, aggregate, and sell that data with very few restrictions 
as long as it gave notice and obtained consent. The underlying theory is that 
information that has been made public (i.e., is no longer secret) is not private 
and therefore is not protected. The same reasoning has applied to 
government and law enforcement access to data. The third-party doctrine 
holds that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information shared with 
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38–41 (diagramming the gradual redesign of urban arterials). 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that other federal 
courts have uniformly concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation does not protect 
subscriber information provided to an internet provider, including IP addresses, because that information 
is voluntarily conveyed to third parties); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016–17, 1022–
24 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing class action suit claiming that defendant—a social media company—
violated the Stored Communications Act by disclosing users’ personal information to advertisers, 
marketing companies, data brokers, and other third parties). 
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a third party because that information is no longer private.180 This is why the 
Supreme Court struck down a constitutional warrant requirement for law 
enforcement to access the telephone numbers a person dials; when people 
share those numbers with the phone company, they “assume[] the risk that 
the information [will] be divulged to the police,”181 even though many 
people might consider that information sensitive. However, these legal rules 
were developed in an analog world without widespread digital recording. 
They become problematic when an individual will be subject to extensive 
recording by robotic sensors by virtue of the mere act of existing in an urban 
public space. If recording in public spaces is ubiquitous, as it will be with 
urban robotics, there will be no meaningful way to opt out of recording 
without withdrawing from public spaces altogether. The same is true of the 
third-party doctrine. If robots record nearly everything that happens in 
public, the very act of moving in public spaces will expose personal 
information to collection by third parties. This shift is already under way 
through the widespread use of technologies like vehicle license plate readers, 
and it is changing the way police and private security forces conduct their 
business.182 
There is no federal regulation that addresses this problem; in fact, there 
is no single, comprehensive federal privacy law at all.183 State laws have also 
struggled to fill this gap. Still, some regulators and lawmakers have been 
innovating, which has led to some noteworthy legal developments.184 There 
are at least four approaches to coping with the erosion of privacy in public 
spaces by ubiquitous computing: (1) adapting existing doctrine and U.S. 
law; (2) regulating the design and deployment of information systems with 
limits on collection and use of data; (3) allowing data collection but giving 
consumers more control over their data; and (4) rethinking the third-party 
doctrine. Privacy law is in a state of flux, and its future shape is unknown. 
But as policymakers at all levels experiment with new regulatory 
approaches, cities will feel the impacts and serve as the testbeds for new 
rules. 
                                                                                                                     
180 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
181 Id. at 745. 
182 Josh Kaplan, License Plate Readers Are Creeping into Neighborhoods Across the Country, 
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183 The United States takes a sectoral approach to privacy, regulating specific industries or sectors 
like banking or health. The Federal Privacy Act governs how federal agencies keep a “system of records,” 
but these rules are not relevant to the privacy issues cities will face with robotics. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) 
(2012). 
184 Margot Kaminski, Toward Defining Privacy Expectations in an Age of Oversharing, 
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A. Adapting Existing Laws to New Technologies 
The efforts of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC,” or the 
“Commission”) at regulating IoT are emblematic of the first approach: 
adapting existing laws to cover the uses of new technologies in public 
spaces. The FTC is the principal privacy regulator in the United States. 
Absent an industry-specific law, most firms’ privacy practices fall under the 
FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or 
affecting commerce.”185 The scope of this authority allows the FTC to target 
companies that break public promises about their privacy practices—for 
instance, through companies’ publicly available privacy policies—but 
imposes few substantive requirements beyond what companies themselves 
promise. The Commission has not yet brought an enforcement action against 
any commercial robotics company for privacy violations, but its work with 
IoT device makers suggests how it might handle similar technology.186  
The Commission is aware of the privacy challenges posed by IoT, and 
its approach is best captured by the Nomi consent decree. Nomi is a company 
that partners with retailers to track shoppers’ locations within stores using 
sensors that track cell phone MAC addresses.187 This information can tell 
retailers who visits their stores, how long they spend inside, and even what 
they might want to buy.188 The FTC enforcement action alleged that Nomi 
promised in its privacy policy to inform individuals when they were being 
tracked and to offer an opt-out mechanism but ultimately did neither.189 
Because it broke these promises, the FTC was able to bring a complaint 
against Nomi for deceptive acts. 
The Nomi action highlights both the FTC’s willingness to enforce 
privacy rules in public spaces and the limits of its authority. Had Nomi 
simply tracked individuals without making promises about notice and choice 
and thereby avoided committing any deceptive acts, the FTC would have 
been largely powerless to stop it.190 This is the big gap in U.S. federal privacy 
law: absent a sector-specific law or regulation, companies can largely do as 
they please so long as they do not commit a deceptive act.191 While the FTC 
                                                                                                                     
185 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
186 The FTC has enforced against makers of connected toys for having poor cybersecurity, but such 
toys are outside the scope of our discussion. 
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has worked hard to adapt to new technologies, it can only do so much with 
its existing legal tools.  Robotics companies operate under this same regime. 
They can and do deploy sophisticated sensors in public spaces, gathering 
personal data (such as video footage of people) governed only by the public 
promises of the company. There is no law stopping companies from reselling 
this data or using it for a secondary purpose.  
The SELF DRIVE Act follows this adaptive approach, requiring AV 
companies to develop a privacy plan that addresses data collection, use, 
sharing, storage of information, and other common privacy practices.192 The 
law does not mandate any particular privacy practices or create a minimum 
level of protections however. For this reason, the SELF DRIVE Act’s 
requirement for AV companies to have a privacy policy may not be adequate 
to protect privacy. Without more substantive rules to set a floor of protection 
in company data practices, companies will largely get to set their own rules 
of the road. 
B. Comprehensive Privacy Regulation and the Design and Deployment of 
Technology 
Recent changes to European data protection law exemplify the second 
approach of comprehensive regulation that seeks to influence the design and 
deployment of technologies. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is a comprehensive overhaul of European privacy law that, among 
other things, requires that organizations only collect information when they 
have a legal basis to do so, and only as much as necessary.193 The legal bases 
to collect data are narrowly defined categories like consent or a “legitimate 
interest” (where the company’s interests are carefully weighed against the 
individual’s privacy rights).194 This requirement applies even where data is 
collected in public spaces, such as by a CCTV camera. Organizations must 
conduct a data privacy impact assessment when handling large volumes of 
sensitive data195 and have data retention limits, meaning they can only keep 
the data as long as necessary.196 Where companies rely on consent, it must 
be granular, meaning that companies that “seek[] consent for various 
different purposes should provide a separate opt-in for each purpose.”197 
                                                                                                                     
Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the FTC’s command to LabMD was 
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2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 36 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
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195 Id. art. 35(3)(b), at 53.  
196 Id. art. 5(1)(e), at 35–36.  
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These provisions offer much more privacy protection than laws in the United 
States.  
The GDPR seeks to constrain companies by creating guidelines on how 
they design and deploy technology. Stiff penalties of up to four percent of 
global revenue create strong incentives for firms to comply.198 Firms must 
now justify the data they collect and apply strict safeguards. They must 
respect principles of fairness and transparency in their data processing 
activities. The effect of the law is that firms have afforded new rights to users 
and revamped their privacy practices to comply with the law. Many have 
lauded the strong privacy protections, though some worry that the law will 
stifle the development of AI.199 
A recent proposal in Washington State called the Washington Privacy 
Act (WPA) takes a similar approach, borrowing several of the concepts and 
rules from the GDPR. These include, for example, rights of access and data 
portability, requirements for contracts between controllers and processors, 
and opt-in consent.200 However, its penalties are capped at $2500 per 
violation or $7500 per intentional violation.201 It also preempts local 
governments “regarding the processing of personal data by controllers and 
processors.”202 
The WPA also puts Washington at the forefront of the debate over facial 
recognition. It would require private facial recognition firms to place a 
human in the loop by “employ[ing] meaningful human review prior to 
making final decisions” that “produce legal effects concerning 
consumers.”203 Facial recognition companies must also obtain consent from 
consumers, post conspicuous warnings where they employ the 
technology,204 and in many cases make their services available for audit for 
“accuracy and unfair bias” through an application programmer interface.205 
These provisions would impact any urban robots that implemented facial 
                                                                                                                     
198 GDPR, art. 83(5), at 83. 
199 There is controversy over whether GDPR Recitation 71 requires that automated decision making 
be “explainable.” If so, then current deep learning techniques that are largely inscrutable by their nature 
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recognition for navigational, social, or any other purposes. Any data an 
urban robot collected would also be subject to the WPA.206 
The WPA also addresses state and local government use of facial 
recognition. It bans governments from using facial recognition for “ongoing 
surveillance of specified individuals in public spaces,” except with a court 
order or in an emergency involving imminent danger or risk of death.207 One 
concern is that because this provision only applies to ongoing surveillance, 
it leaves the door open to using facial recognition in other situations, such as 
to match still pictures against drivers’ license pictures, without a court order. 
The lack of a probable cause warrant requirement is also troubling. But the 
greatest concern for this Paper is the potentially onerous preemption of local 
governments. Cities are pioneering privacy regulation for both the private 
and public sectors, but the WPA could cut off that fertile area of policy 
innovation prematurely. It is possible, for instance, that the WPA would 
invalidate Seattle’s police surveillance ordinance, which has been heralded 
as a model for cities across the country.208 Further, if a city wanted to protect 
the privacy of its residents by controlling how urban robots used facial 
recognition, the WPA’s private sector facial recognition sections could 
interfere. The WPA would certainly be an important tool in any litigation 
over the matter. A separate Washington proposal, SB 5528, would impose a 
moratorium on state and local government use of the technology until the 
State Attorney General can certify that it has been independently audited and 
is accurate and free of bias.209 SB 5528 also requires a warrant to use facial 
recognition to monitor public spaces and prohibits using it on any 
police-worn body camera footage.210 As of writing, neither proposal has 
cleared the legislature. 
C. Strengthening Consumer Control 
Some state privacy laws seek to strengthen consumers’ rights and 
control over their data instead of targeting digital technology with 
comprehensive reforms. However, these proposals would still impact the 
robotics market as long as robots are collecting information on consumers. 
                                                                                                                     
206 See id. § 4(1)(a) (stating that the WPA applies to businesses that collect and process the data of 
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The recently passed California Consumer Privacy Act211 places fewer 
restrictions on data collection and minimization than the GDPR and instead 
seeks to offer consumers more control over the data they share with 
companies. It creates several rights for individuals, such as the right to 
request deletion of data212 and the right to opt out of sharing with third 
parties.213 However, the law exempts “publicly available information” from 
its definition of personal information.214 This definition will likely limit its 
protections in public spaces. For example, whether a video recording of a 
public space captures “publicly available information” is an open question. 
Though the law seeks to offer consumers more control over their data with 
strong opt-out and consent requirements, it does not strictly limit what 
information companies collect or what they can do with it. It remains to be 
seen whether this approach addresses problems of ubiquitous recording in 
public. The law is also likely to change, given the unique circumstances 
under which it was passed.215 With an effective date of January 1, 2020, there 
will be much time before the impacts of the law are felt or fully understood. 
California is not alone in pushing to expand consumer privacy 
protections at the state level. New York State has proposed its own privacy 
law, the Right to Know Act of 2019,216 which focuses on transparency for 
when companies share personal data with third parties. It would require 
companies to identify third parties with whom they share information and 
the categories of information that they share.217 Vermont recently passed a 
law that would require data brokers to register with the State and disclose 
certain information such as the number of data breaches each year,218 and 
Washington has its own proposal that mirrors Vermont’s.219  
D. Doctrinal Reassessment of Privacy in Public 
The Supreme Court has been at the forefront of reshaping privacy 
doctrines that have previously offered very few protections in public spaces. 
Recent Supreme Court cases have begun to reconsider the third-party 
doctrine in light of large amounts of personal data that are subject to 
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recording by modern digital technology. The first hint of change came with 
United States v. Jones, a case about whether the police needed a warrant to 
surreptitiously track a suspect’s vehicle by attaching a GPS device to the 
undercarriage.220 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that the use of the 
GPS tracker without a warrant constituted a search because by attaching the 
device to the defendant’s car, police had trespassed against his property.221 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito wrote separate concurrences, with Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joining Alito, supporting a different rationale 
than Justice Scalia’s property-based trespass theory. They reasoned that 
even though the GPS tracked information that could be observed in public 
and not normally considered private (the location of the defendant’s vehicle 
on public roads), using technology to collect large amounts of this 
information could trigger the privacy protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.222 Thus, in Jones five Justices on the Court expressed support 
for the “Mosaic Theory” that recording and compiling large amounts of 
public information could violate a person’s privacy even if the individual 
data points were not especially revealing on their own.223  
The Court again recognized the sensitive nature of digital stores of 
information in Riley v. California, when it held unanimously that examining 
the digital contents of a cell phone was a Fourth Amendment search 
requiring a warrant.224 Chief Justice Roberts wrote that a cell phone is not 
simply another piece of property to be searched incident to arrest, but rather 
a modern tool to store large quantities of potentially sensitive data.225 He 
reasoned that the breadth of different types of data, collected in large 
amounts in one place, could be especially revealing.226 He concluded by 
writing that “[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological 
convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for 
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”227 Thus, in Riley the Court 
recognized that the cell phones contain personal information that requires 
protection by the Fourth Amendment and that digital technologies that 
collect large amounts of revealing data can present an acute threat to privacy. 
Chief Justice Roberts built on the foundation laid in the previous two 
cases to reshape the third-party doctrine for the digital age in Carpenter v. 
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United States.228 In Carpenter, the Court decided whether the Fourth 
Amendment required a warrant for an individual’s cell phone location 
records.229 Investigators in the Carpenter case used the Stored 
Communications Act to request the history of which cell phone towers the 
defendant’s phone had connected with around the same time as a string of 
robberies in Detroit.230 The phone’s connections to the cell towers revealed 
the defendant’s location around the time of the robberies, which prosecutors 
used to convict him.231 Law enforcement was able to acquire the information 
using the Stored Communications Act (which has a lower standard) instead 
of a warrant because of the Court’s ruling in Smith v. Maryland that 
individuals have no privacy rights in information they share with third 
parties like telephone companies.232 
However, Roberts’ opinion declined to extend Smith v. Maryland and 
United States v. Miller and held that the Fourth Amendment required a 
warrant to access a suspect’s cell tower location history.233 Although it did 
not overturn Smith or Miller, by declining to extend those cases to cell tower 
location history, Carpenter marks a significant reversal of the third-party 
doctrine. Roberts’ reasoning relied heavily on the impact of digital 
technology. Americans share digital data with third parties in quantities and 
kinds that would have been unfathomable to the framers, and so the new 
digital reality warrants a change in legal doctrine. Roberts also noted that in 
the time between Carpenter’s conviction and when the Court heard the case, 
the number of cell towers had greatly increased, which made cell tower 
location information much more precise and revealing.234 The proliferation 
of cell phone towers is analogous to advances in IoT generally and robotics 
specifically; sensors become more capable and more numerous and gather 
even more personal information in public. Professor Orin Kerr sees 
Carpenter as a form of “equilibrium-adjustment,” where the Court adjusts 
privacy protections to preserve privacy in light of encroachments from new 
technologies.235 Roberts’ opinion was controversial, however, with four 
Justices dissenting.  
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent was perhaps the most intriguing, as it proposed 
an alternate, property-based theory to protect private information shared 
with third parties. In his lone dissent, he reasoned that positive law may have 
indicated an intent to treat cell phone location data as private by enacting 
                                                                                                                     
228 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
229 Id. at 2221. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979).  
233 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
234 Id. at 2211–12. 




372 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
protections against unauthorized dissemination.236 Therefore, the 
information concerning Carpenter’s location could be considered his 
property for Fourth Amendment purposes.237 If that information was 
Carpenter’s property, then investigators seized it without a warrant in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Gorsuch argued that the property-based 
theory of the Fourth Amendment was in line with other property-based 
decisions such as Jones and Florida v. Jardines.238 He would have preferred 
to overturn Katz and do away with the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
in favor of this theory, but lamented that the property theory of the Fourth 
Amendment had not been briefed or developed by the parties.239 
The Court is in the middle of a debate about the theoretical 
underpinnings of Fourth Amendment privacy that will have significant 
implications for the relationship between technology and privacy in public 
spaces. More cases addressing new technologies will come before the Court 
in time, and this debate is likely to intensify as robots are increasingly 
deployed in public spaces. 
E. Proposed Comprehensive Federal Privacy Legislation 
2018 and 2019 have seen multiple proposals for new federal privacy 
legislation that vary greatly in their approaches to privacy protection, likely 
in response to a series of privacy scandals in 2018 involving Facebook and 
other large tech firms. Some proposals rely on existing concepts in privacy 
law, especially consent and transparency through privacy notices.240 While 
this is an important part of the conversation, as we discuss above the nature 
of robots and IoT in public spaces may require protections beyond traditional 
notions of notice and consent. Here, we focus on proposals that go further 
toward addressing this reality.  
Instead of relying on notice and consent, the Data Care Act would 
impose certain fiduciary duties on online service providers similar to those 
required of attorneys and corporate board members. The Act creates duties 
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality and expands the duty to inform in the 
event of a data breach.241 It also gives the FTC rulemaking authority and 
allows for separate enforcement by state attorneys general, although pending 
FTC actions would preempt states for their duration.242 
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The idea of data fiduciaries could have potential as an alternative to 
notice and consent regimes that struggle to address robots and the IoT. 
However, in its current form, the Data Care Act is limited to online service 
providers,243 so it would not apply to robots, where physicality is a major 
feature. Even so, it is an important start to a broader debate.  
The most ambitious proposal is likely Senator Ron Wyden’s Consumer 
Data Protection Act. The Consumer Data Protection Act is not limited to 
online service providers, but rather applies to any “person, partnership, or 
corporation over which the Commission has jurisdiction under section 
5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2)[)],” with 
an exception for small businesses.244 The bill’s many provisions include 
recognition of “noneconomic” injuries in FTC jurisprudence,245 
implementation of a national Do-Not-Track system,246 and impact 
assessments for automated decision systems.247 It would not only give the 
FTC rulemaking authority but also increase its funding and establish a 
Bureau of Technology within the Commission.248  
Two other proposals take divergent approaches but share one important 
feature: federal preemption of state (and by implication local) privacy rules. 
First, the American Data Dissemination Act of 2019 takes the protections of 
the Privacy Act of 1974, which currently only applies to federal agencies, 
and applies them to online service providers.249 The Act and resulting 
regulations would preempt any state laws as far as they relate to internet 
service providers.250 Alternatively, the Center for Democracy and 
Technology (CDT), a prominent think tank and advocacy group, has also 
proposed model baseline federal privacy legislation. The CDT bill would 
apply to any “person or business entity that as part of its activities processes 
personal information in or affecting interstate commerce,” but excludes 
government actors and natural persons.251 It proposes individual rights that 
appear to be inspired by the GDPR: rights to access and correct, data 
portability, and deletion.252 In a novel innovation, it defines certain acts as 
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per se deceptive or unfair, effectively strengthening and broadening the 
FTC’s enforcement authority.253 However, it only gives the FTC rulemaking 
authority in certain narrow subjects, such as for security, health information, 
and unfair targeted advertising.254 As with the American Data Dissemination 
Act, the CDT’s proposed bill would preempt privacy laws by state and local 
governments.255 Because the proposal applies to all companies, not just 
online service providers, the scope of this preemption is much broader and 
would include many if not all of the local privacy laws we discuss in this 
Paper.  
As of writing, the most recent new proposal is the Consumer Online 
Privacy Rights Act (COPRA). COPRA would apply to any entity already 
covered by the FTC Act that transfers data that identifies or is reasonably 
linkable to an individual.256 It would create a duty of loyalty for such entities 
as well as individual rights, such as rights of access, deletion, data 
minimization, and data security.257 Notably, it would preempt state laws that 
conflict with its provisions, but not those that create stronger protections.258 
One common thread is that many of these proposals are specific to 
online service providers. This is likely because one of the principle catalysts 
for this legislative activity is the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal.259 
Lawmakers are reacting to the problem in front of them, which is privacy 
abuse by online platforms and service providers. This is important and 
necessary work, but it ignores the looming privacy issues that are around the 
corner with robotics, IoT, and the third-party doctrine. 
F. Cities as Testbeds of Data Privacy 
It is difficult to predict precisely what impact these changes in privacy 
law will have on cities, but those impacts will certainly be felt strongly at 
the local level. Cities are the places where robots, and their accompanying 
sensors, will be tested and deployed. The physical infrastructure of cities is 
also likely to be embedded with sensors and computers to allow the robots 
to interact more smoothly with the built environment. Further, the density of 
people in cities means that the scale of data collection will be at its greatest 
in urban areas. Cities have an interest in using the data robotics companies 
collect and in protecting the privacy rights of their residents. Do 
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comprehensive privacy protections prevent firms from developing cutting 
edge technologies? What balance of market power and control between 
firms and individuals allows for innovation and privacy protection? Will a 
change in the third-party doctrine impact policing practices at the local 
level? These questions will play out at the local level.260 As privacy law 
continues to evolve, cities can serve as testbeds for governance not just of 
the robots but the data those robots collect.  
Ira Rubinstein has begun an important exploration of the role of cities in 
privacy policymaking through “privacy localism.”261 He documents the rise 
of local privacy laws and surveillance oversight bodies in the cities of Seattle 
and New York. He argues the federal and state privacy laws leave significant 
gaps by failing to protect against surveillance in public spaces (the “public 
surveillance gap”) and failing to protect local government records (the “Fair 
Information Practices gap”).262 Because privacy localism fills these gaps and 
fulfills the democratic values inherent in federalism, cities should be allowed 
to develop their own privacy localist programs within the framework of 
federalism.263 
Cities will continue to fill the privacy gap for urban robotics because 
federal legislative attempts to address privacy issues with robotics are 
inadequate. As discussed, the SELF DRIVE Act’s privacy rules are based 
on existing, inadequate privacy frameworks that rely on self-regulation 
through corporate privacy policies.264 The AV START Act establishes an 
AV “Data Access Advisory Committee” to consider the issue of privacy and 
AVs and issue a report to Congress within 180 days.265 However, federal 
regulators are prohibited from issuing new rules on AV privacy until the 
committee submits its report.266 So the SELF DRIVE Act establishes no 
baseline protections for this highly sensitive technology, and the public will 
not even know what privacy protections result from AV START for 180 
days. Federal rules for drone privacy have also been lacking. The FAA has 
explicitly declined to issue rules on drone privacy. Meanwhile, these 
technologies are being deployed and tested in urban public spaces and 
collecting large amounts of data. It is up to cities to set their own rules of the 
road as the sites of this experimentation. 
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Cities continue to innovate with respect to privacy protections. Professor 
Rubinstein documents many salient examples, in particular local ordinances 
that place restrictions on police use and procurement of new surveillance 
technologies like drones.267 Cities, however, have additional tools available 
to them. For instance, the city attorney of Los Angeles recently sued The 
Weather Channel app for unfair and fraudulent business practices, alleging 
that it failed to properly disclose the extent of its tracking and data sharing 
with third parties to consumers.268  
We agree that cities should be empowered to develop local privacy 
regimes. Not only does privacy localism comport with the values of 
federalism, it reflects the fact that impacts of privacy regulations will be felt 
most keenly at the local level. Any federal action related to data use by 
robots in public spaces or to creating nationwide baseline privacy 
protections should be aware of the unique and evolving role of cities in 
developing privacy policy. Such federal action should respect the autonomy 
of cities, especially when it comes to preemption. Overly broad or aggressive 
preemption will only serve to stifle policy innovation. Further work is 
required to explore the implications of robotics on privacy localism and the 
role of privacy localism to shape privacy policymaking more broadly. 
IV. PREEMPTION, CITIES, AND THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS 
SYSTEMS 
This Part is an account of the law of urban robotics. It begins with an 
overview of federal and state preemption and city police powers, noting that 
federal and state governments can greatly restrict local authority, although 
there are some spheres where cities typically exercise their authority. Next, 
it surveys existing or proposed federal and state robotics laws, with 
particular attention to preemption issues. We then provide an account of how 
cities are regulating urban robots and serving as testbeds for innovation.  
A. An Overview of Federal Preemption and Home Rule Doctrines 
Two types of preemption are important for this account of urban 
robotics: federal preemption of states and localities and state preemption of 
localities. Federal preemption is where federal law supersedes and 
invalidates a state or local government law. It is based on the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that federal law and the 
Constitution are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
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to the Contrary notwithstanding.”269 The dispositive question for a court in 
finding federal preemption is whether Congress intended to preempt the 
states on the matter.270 If Congress expresses its preemptive intent in the text 
of the law, it has created express preemption.271 If a court finds express 
preemption, it must then determine “the substance and scope of Congress’ 
displacement of state law.”272 The Supreme Court has said that when 
statutory preemption language has more than one plausible reading, courts 
should “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”273 
If a court finds no language that expressly preempts state law, it may 
still find implied preemption in the legislation’s structure and purpose.274 
Implied preemption takes two forms: conflict preemption and field 
preemption. With conflict preemption, state or local laws either conflict with 
federal law or present an obstacle to the congressional purpose.275 With field 
preemption, Congress has expressed an intent to occupy the field on that 
issue, leaving no room for states to supplement the law or otherwise 
regulate.276 For example, the Supreme Court has held Illinois licensing and 
training requirements for hazardous waste handling to be invalided by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s regulations.277 
While federal law may be supreme, the constitutional system of 
federalism provides only certain enumerated powers to the federal 
government, while reserving all others to the states.278 The Tenth 
Amendment prevents the federal government from “commandeering” state 
governments by imposing affirmative duties to do things that they would not 
otherwise do.279 For example, Congress may not force states to assume 
liability for radioactive waste280 or use state police resources to conduct 
federal background checks for firearm purchases.281 Congress may condition 
federal grant money on certain state actions, such as raising the drinking age 
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to twenty-one.282 However, the conditions of the grant may not be so onerous 
that they coerce the states into action.283 
State preemption of local governments does not operate under the same 
constitutional framework as federal preemption. While the U.S. Constitution 
reserves broad power for states through the Tenth Amendment,284 cities are 
not even mentioned in the document. Broadly speaking, there are two views 
of local power in relation to states: Dillon’s Rule and home rule. Under the 
traditional view described in Dillon’s Rule, cities are simply 
administratively convenient organizations that derive their power from 
states, so they only have the limited powers granted by the state.285 They are 
not themselves sovereign. Discontent with Dillon’s Rule eventually led 
states to grant more powers to cities, first on matters of “local” concern, and 
later, broader “police powers.”286 Police powers encompass the public’s 
health, safety, welfare, and morals.287 However, they are still “subject to 
denial of power in a particular substantive field by specific act of the state 
legislature.”288 That is, local governments typically do not have unfettered 
police powers even under home rule. States enact home rule either in their 
constitutions or legislatively.289 Home rule powers come in two forms: (1) 
empowerment/initiative—the ability to enact substantive policy; and (2) 
immunity—“the ability to resist encroachment from another governmental 
entity or from a private party.”290 
Though state preemption of cities exists under a different constitutional 
framework than federal preemption, it often operates in similar ways. As 
with the federal level, state preemption can be either express or implied.291 
Implied preemption in turn can be either field or conflict, although most 
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states do not use these exact terms.292 However, the nuances of home rule 
versus Dillon’s Rule and the exact wording of state grants of authority to 
cities can impact the outcome of state preemption cases.293 For example, 
Oregon’s state constitution has been read to create a presumption for 
preemption in criminal law matters but against preemption in civil 
matters.294  
A group of legal experts convened by the American Constitution Society 
(citing the National League of Cities) identifies five categories of municipal 
power. Structural authority is the power to choose or modify the form of 
city government.295 Personnel authority is the power to set employment 
policies, compensation, and collective bargaining.296 Fiscal authority is the 
power to “raise revenue, borrow money, and spend.”297 Proprietary 
authority is the power to set policy through the procurement and contracting 
process, what we call market making.298 Regulatory or “functional” 
authority encompasses the “police power” to set substantive policy and 
regulate health, safety, welfare, and morals.299 Cities often rely on regulatory 
power when setting rules for firms, so it is often at issue in state preemption 
fights.300 
Home rule schemes vary a great deal from state to state. In states where 
the home rule grant is purely legislative, the state can preempt any city 
action, and cities have no immunity.301 On the other extreme is the Colorado 
state constitution, which expressly protects local authority.302 
Cities and state legislatures have engaged in high profile preemption 
conflicts on a variety of issues. These issues run the gamut from 
anti-discrimination rules for transgender individuals, to sanctuary city and 
minimum wage laws, to municipal broadband and ride-sharing apps.303 
Cities feel that they have an interest in the impact of technological change 
on the health or safety of their residents or the provision of city services. 
Where firms operate new technological platforms in cities, namely ride and 
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room sharing, several states have preempted city regulation.304 Cities have 
also sought to impose regulation or alter street design to keep traffic 
algorithms like Waze from redirecting freeway traffic onto urban and 
suburban side streets.305 These recurring debates highlight the fact that cities 
occupy a legally difficult space when it comes to the source and scope of 
their power to regulate.  
Even with the variety that exists among states, cities tend to have a great 
deal of authority in certain areas related to environmental design. They 
typically have broad powers in zoning to determine the nature and character 
of city neighborhoods.306 Cities usually control the maintenance of public 
streets within their territory, although the lines of which government body is 
responsible for which street can blur.307 Cities also regulate the design of 
public and private spaces by placing restrictions on building height or space 
between the building and the street (called the “setback”).308 Cities exercise 
broad taxing authority to raise funds for improvements to public space, 
manage those improvements, and maintain the condition of the space, either 
in house or in contract with the private sector. Many utility services, such as 
parking, electricity, water, communications, wastewater, storm water, and 
solid waste, occupy the same rights-of-way and may be publicly owned.  
The preemption debate is already beginning to play out with urban 
robots. Proposed federal autonomous vehicle legislation has quite broad 
preemption language. One libertarian think tank has raised the alarm that 
ride-sharing firms will lobby cities to ban individual ownership of 
autonomous vehicles and urged states to preempt cities on that issue.309 
Several state laws currently preempt city regulation of autonomous 
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vehicles.310 On the other hand, the states with delivery robot laws on the 
books explicitly allow cities to regulate such machines.311  
B. Federal and State Robotics Laws 
The following section reviews local, state, and federal laws and policies 
pertaining to autonomously controlled vehicles, delivery robots, security and 
entertainment robots, and drones.312 
For each category of robot, we examine the interaction between different 
levels of government and the likely sources of conflict or preemption. We 
also discuss the impact that preemption might have on the urban built 
environment or the design of the robots themselves. 
1. Autonomous Vehicles 
AV regulation in many cities is in danger of preemption by both state 
and federal laws. Cities have been at the forefront of AV testing and 
employed sundry regulatory approaches based on local needs and political 
realities. However, some state laws already preempt city regulation of AVs, 
and proposed federal legislation would go even further, cutting off this 
period of technological and regulatory experimentation prematurely.  
The diversity of local AV regulations reflects the varied needs of cities 
to control their public rights-of-way as well as the current experimental state 
of this technology. Many cities have pilot programs to implement automated 
vehicles into their own transportation systems, such as with autonomous 
buses.313 For instance, the city of Atlanta has created a “smart corridor” that 
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pairs a driverless bus with smart infrastructure like traffic lights that will 
communicate with the AV. Cities experimenting with autonomous buses 
have made infrastructure upgrades that incorporate computers that can 
communicate with AVs.314 In many cases, these pilot programs appear to be 
implemented through public-private partnerships between cities and 
firms.315 With the exception of Boston, we have not been able to find 
publicly available copies of these agreements.316 Boston requires 
compliance with federal AV safety guidelines and strictly controls the 
driving conditions under which companies can test their AVs.317 This 
includes weather conditions, time of day, and presence of safety drivers who 
can take control of the vehicle in an emergency. Cities such as Ann Arbor 
and San Jose have also created dedicated physical spaces for automated 
vehicle testing.318 They have already begun planning the necessary 
infrastructure upgrades to accommodate and prepare for widespread 
automated vehicle deployment.319 Chandler, Arizona has become the first 
city to modify its zoning laws to accommodate AV passenger pick-up and 
drop-off.320 Private companies have proposed dedicated lanes of traffic for 
AVs both on highways and city streets, although to our knowledge no city 
has taken steps to implement such lanes yet.321 And consultants and firms 
are promoting the necessity of infrastructure upgrades to promote AVs.322 
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 In sum, in regulating automated vehicles, most cities have relied on 
their proprietary authority to form public-private partnerships with firms or 
their regulatory authority to shape the physical space in which the 
technologies operate. A notable exception is the ordinance proposed in 
Chicago, which would limit automated vehicles to permitted firms for test 
purposes.323 The law’s sponsors cited cybersecurity concerns and potential 
job losses to automation as motivations.324 They had considered an outright 
ban but withdrew that proposal in light of Illinois’ preemption of local AV 
regulations.325 
As with cities, state lawmakers differ significantly in their approach to 
AVs. Although Professor Bryant Walker Smith has argued that AVs are 
generally legal on public roads,326 many states have passed legislation or 
issued executive orders regulating them in some way. According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, at the time of writing twenty-one 
states have enacted some form of autonomous vehicle legislation, and six 
more have relevant executive orders.327 A large majority of states (forty-one) 
have considered legislation since 2012.328  
 Five of these states, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Texas, have preempted municipal regulation of autonomous vehicles in their 
legislation.329 Illinois’ law is the narrowest. It states that a city may not 
“enact an ordinance prohibiting the use of Automated Driving System 
equipped vehicles on its roadways.”330 However, cities may still regulate 
AVs for “traffic control purposes.”331 Nevada prohibits cities from singling 
out AVs for taxes, permits, or other requirements, but preserves the state’s 
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ability to collect a generally applicable business license fee.332 Presumably 
other generally applicable laws are permitted as well. North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Texas have much broader preemption, prohibiting any 
“regulation” of AVs by cities altogether.333 In addition, cities in Dillon’s 
Rule states would not have the authority to regulate AVs unless state 
legislatures expressly grant it. However, even Dillon’s Rule cities would 
likely have authority over certain local concerns that impact AVs, such as 
zoning, lane placement, and other infrastructure management issues (such 
as whether to deploy smart infrastructure that can communicate with AVs).  
Other state laws such as California’s have not expressly preempted cities 
but vested regulatory authority in an administrative agency such as the 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).334 This regulatory scheme could 
have the effect of creating implied preemption, with the DMV taking 
regulatory power out of the hands of cities. Mayors in San Francisco and 
Pittsburgh have expressed that this is likely the case, at least as far as being 
able to ban AVs completely.335 However, the scope of city authority in this 
regard has not been tested in court.  
Massachusetts represents a more collaborative model by creating 
partnerships with the Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
(MassDOT), companies, and local governments. Executive Order 572 
requires companies to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with the Agency and the cities where they will operate.336 MassDOT and 
participating cities in Massachusetts signed a separate MOU to establish a 
common application for AV companies, approve testing locations in the 
cities, and periodically review technical and policy advances in the AV 
space.337 Now, in order to put AVs on the road in one of the urban testbeds 
in Massachusetts (like Boston), a company must sign an MOU with the city 
and then complete a permit application with MassDOT.338 This process 
involves numerous commitments from companies, including standards for 
                                                                                                                     
332 NEV. VEH. CODE ch. 482A, § 110 (2017).  
333 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(i) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-30-105 (2017); TEX. TRANSP. 
CODE § 545.452(b) (2017).   
334 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (2012).  
335 Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Mayor Calls on Self-Driving Car Companies to Agree to Voluntary 
SF Safety Test, S.F. EXAMINER (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.sfexaminer.com/mayor-calls-self-driving-
car-companies-agree-voluntary-sf-safety-tests/; Timothy B. Lee, Uber Wants to Test Driverless Cars in 
Pittsburgh Again—The Mayor Is Pissed, ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/ 
cars/2018/05/uber-wants-to-test-driverless-cars-in-pittsburgh-again-the-mayor-is-pissed/.  
336 Exec. Order No. 572, To Promote the Testing and Deployment of Highly Automated Driving 
Technologies (2016), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/11/pg/eo572.pdf.  
337 Memorandum of Understanding to Facilitate Testing of Autonomous Vehicles, MASSDOT (June 
21, 2018), http://www.mapc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Final_AV-MOU.for_.Signing_6-21-
18_.pdf.  
338 Autonomous Vehicles: Boston’s Approach, CITY BOS., https://www.boston.gov/departments/ 
new-urban-mechanics/autonomous-vehicles-bostons-approach (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).  
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safety drivers, compliance with vehicle safety standards, data sharing, and 
more.339 Although Massachusetts’ approach is standardized across different 
cities, it appears to be the result of collaboration between the state and local 
levels rather than dictated from the top. Further, at this stage, cities with no 
wish to allow AV testing on their roads have no obligation to enter into the 
MOU.  
Existing federal guidance and proposed laws envision a dominant and 
preemptive role for federal regulation of AVs. The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) guidance contemplates a 
dominant role for federal regulators as compared to states.340 The U.S. 
Department of Transportation has convened a series of meetings aimed at 
reducing regulatory barriers and promoting autonomous vehicle 
technology.341 NHTSA solicited comments from the public “to identify any 
regulatory barriers in the existing [Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards] 
to the testing, compliance certification, and compliance verification” of 
autonomous vehicles.342 Fatal and non-fatal accidents involving AVs have 
spurred investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB).343 
In Autonomous Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety, NHTSA 
“strongly encourages States to allow [the U.S. Department of 
Transportation] alone to regulate the safety design and performance aspects 
of [AV] technology. If a State does pursue [AV] performance-related 
regulations, that State should consult with NHTSA.”344 The Agency lists 
state responsibilities as: (1) “[l]icensing human drivers and registering motor 
vehicles in their jurisdictions”; (2) “[e]nacting and enforcing traffic laws and 
regulations”; (3) “[c]onducting safety inspections, where States choose to do 
so”; and (4) “[r]egulating motor vehicle insurance and liability.”345  
Federal legislation that has passed in the House contains broad 
preemption language that would prevent states and cities from regulating 
                                                                                                                     
339 Template MOU for Autonomous Vehicle Testing in Boston, supra note 316.  
340 It was a federal agency that kickstarted the development of AVs. The Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge is considered to have set off the current boom in 
AV research and development. Alex Davies, Inside the Races that Jump-Started the Self-Driving Car, 
WIRED (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/darpa-grand-urban-challenge-self-driving-car/. 
341 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS: A VISION FOR SAFETY 2.0, at i–ii, 
https://www.transportation.gov/AV (last updated Feb. 27, 2019).  
342 Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles With Automated Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg. 
2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571).   
343 Ryan Beene & Alan Levin, U.S. NTSB Opens Probe of Second Tesla Autopilot Crash, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/u-s-
safety-board-opens-probe-of-second-tesla-autopilot-crash; Megan Rose Dickey, Uber’s Fatal Self-
Driving Car Crash Prompts NTSB Investigation, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/19/ubers-fatal-self-driving-car-crash-prompts-ntsb-investigation/.  
344 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 341, at 20. 
345 Id. (The relevant section in the 2016 guidance under Obama was functionally the same). 
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autonomous vehicles. The SELF DRIVE Act contains the following 
preemption language:  
No State or political subdivision of a State may maintain, 
enforce, prescribe, or continue in effect any law or regulation 
regarding the design, construction, or performance of highly 
automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or 
components of automated driving systems unless such law or 
regulation is identical to a standard prescribed under this 
chapter.346  
A “political subdivision of a State” refers to cities and local governments, as 
cities typically derive their police power from the state.347 The bill allows 
cities and states to maintain laws related to “registration, licensing, driving 
education and training, insurance, law enforcement, crash investigations, 
safety and emissions inspections, congestion management of vehicles on 
[state or city streets], or traffic unless the law or regulation is an 
unreasonable restriction on the design, construction, or performance” of 
autonomous vehicles.348 Companies say that this preemption language is 
necessary to avoid a patchwork of regulation that will hinder innovation, but 
it has drawn criticism from safety and consumer advocacy groups and state 
governments.349 
The Senate AV START Act, which is still pending as of writing, 
originally had the same language as the House version. However, it has been 
amended to read: “No State or political subdivision of a State may adopt, 
maintain, or enforce any law, rule, or standard regulating the design, 
construction, or performance of a highly automated vehicle or automated 
driving system with respect to any of the safety evaluation report subject 
areas described in section 30107(b).”350 This language is less broad than the 
House bill and preserves some powers specifically for state and local 
governments:  
Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State 
or political subdivision of a State from maintaining, enforcing, 
                                                                                                                     
346 SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 3(b) (2017) (emphasis added). 
347 Id. § 13.  
348 Id. § 3(b).  
349 David Alpert, Have Senators? Ask Them to Let Cities and States Shape How Autonomous 
Vehicles Affect Us All, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://ggwash.org/view/65027/have-
senators-let-cities-and-states-shape-autonomous-vehicles-avs-affect-us-preemption-congress; Tina 
Bellon, U.S. Push for Self-Driving Law Exposes Regulatory Divide, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-analysis/u-s-push-for-self-driving-law-exposes-
regulatory-divide-idUSKCN1BQ24J; Andrew J. Hawkins, Congress Is About to Hand Over the Keys to 
the Big Self-Driving Car Companies—And That’s a Problem, VERGE (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/19/15998356/self-driving-car-congress-legislation-lobbying-safety.  
350 S. 1885, 115th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(A) (2017). 
 
 
2020] URBAN ROBOTICS 387 
prescribing, or continuing in effect any law or regulation 
regarding the sale, distribution, repair, or service of highly 
automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or 
components of automated driving systems by a dealer, 
manufacturer, or distributor.351   
However, one of the preempted subjected areas in section 30107(b) is the 
“expected operational design domain” of AVs.352 This means that the AV 
START Act preempts cities and states with respect to “any roadway and 
infrastructure assets required for the operation of the highly automated 
vehicle or automated driving system, such as roadside equipment, pavement 
markings, signage, and traffic signals, and how it will respond if that 
operational design domain unexpectedly changes.”353 By extending the 
meaning of “design, construction, or performance” to the AV’s operational 
domain, the ambit of the AV START Act’s preemption is potentially very 
broad. 
Both state and federal preemption of cities in the area of AV regulation 
are likely to be significant constraints of city authority. An exhaustive 
analysis of every state’s constitutional scheme regarding home rule versus 
Dillon’s Rule is beyond the scope of this Paper, but state laws that expressly 
preempt city AV laws will face few if any limitations. As noted above, 
several states expressly prohibit cities from regulating AVs in any form. 
Even without express language, cities may still be limited by implied 
preemption by state AV statutes. California’s approach is an example of 
implied preemption effectively limiting cities. Because California DMV 
regulations allow AVs on the state’s public roads, cities there are powerless 
to ban AV access on their streets.354 Such a ban would likely conflict with 
state law and, therefore, be preempted. However, there are many forms of 
regulation that fall short of an outright ban. Suppose cities wanted to create 
certain AV-free zones near public parks or impose lower AV speed limits. 
Or, perhaps the cities wanted to pass a rule requiring AVs to always yield to 
pedestrians. If courts apply broad field preemption or its functional state law 
equivalent, then cities will be foreclosed from doing so. If courts instead 
construe statutes narrowly and apply conflict preemption, then cities will 
have more control over their public rights-of-way. Imagine if a legislature 
mandated the creation of AV hyperlanes, as some in Washington State have 
advocated. Such a mandate could take important local decisions about street 
and sidewalk allocation and design out of the hands of the places that are 
most impacted. 
                                                                                                                     
351 Id. § 3(a)(3)(C).  
352 Id. § 9(a). 
353 Id.  
354 California regulations do require firms to submit law enforcement interaction plans to cities, so 
there is some coordination built into the law. CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ORDER TO ADOPT 
§ 227.38(e) (2017). 
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State preemption could also deprive cities of important sources of 
revenue that may be lost as AVs transform the tax base of cities. If 
widespread AV fleets eliminate urban parking, as some have predicted, then 
cities will lose a significant source of revenue. Cities wishing to levy a tax 
on AVs to make up for this loss in Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, or 
Texas would be barred from doing so.  
Proposed federal AV legislation would also create a great deal of 
uncertainty for cities. The SELF DRIVE Act’s prohibition against 
“unreasonable” restrictions on AV “design, construction, or performance” 
could be read quite broadly, especially because it applies to congestion 
management and traffic laws.355 If constantly roaming AV fleets lead to an 
increase in miles traveled, traffic congestion, and urban sprawl as some 
predict,356 then cities would naturally want to enact policies to combat these 
problems. Is surge or congestion pricing aimed at AVs an “unreasonable 
restriction”? An AV company looking for a sword to wield against cities 
certainly might think so. As discussed above, the AV START Act is 
narrower than SELF DRIVE,357 but the meaning of the term “performance” 
presents a possible problem for cities. Some AVs can communicate with 
smart infrastructure and may even rely on these vehicle-to-infrastructure 
(V2I) capabilities to some extent.358 However, installing smart infrastructure 
can be expensive and time consuming. It is at least arguable that a city that 
refuses to install the “I” of V2I capabilities is hindering the performance of 
an AV. This interpretation is bolstered by the bill’s definition of the 
“expected operational design domain,” which includes infrastructure. Even 
“dumb” infrastructure impacts AV capabilities. For instance, many AVs 
have difficulty navigating traffic lanes that are faded or signs that are 
obscured.359 The locally built environment can be a significant factor in AV 
safety and performance, yet it is unclear whether and how AV START 
would constrain cities in this regard. Both laws may encroach on the 
traditional sphere of authority of cities if they are construed too broadly. 
It is also unclear how state privacy rules might fare under federal 
preemption language in the AV START and SELF DRIVE Acts. The House 
bill currently requires companies to formulate a privacy policy for 
                                                                                                                     
355 SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 3(1) (2017).  
356 Sarah J. Fox, Planning for Density in a Driverless World, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 151, 166–68 (2017); 
Jacques Leslie, Will Self-Driving Cars Usher in a Transportation Utopia or Dystopia, YALE ENV’T 360 
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/will-self-driving-cars-usher-in-a-transportation-utopia-or-
dystopia.   
357 See supra note 350 and surrounding discussion (explaining that the AV START Act is narrower 
than SELF DRIVE). 
358 Conner Forrest, The X-Factor in Our Driverless Future: V2V and V2I, ZDNET (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-x-factor-in-our-driverless-future-v2v-and-v2i/.  
359 Alexandria Sage, Where’s the Lane? Self-Driving Cars Confused by Shabby U.S. Roadways, 
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automated vehicles.360 Having a policy will open companies to enforcement 
action by the FTC if they break the promises contained therein.361 State 
attorneys general may bring similar actions under state law. However, some 
states have substantively stricter privacy rules that may create an 
“unreasonable restriction” on automated vehicles. For example, laws against 
collection of biometric data in Texas, Illinois, and Washington could 
interfere with facial recognition capabilities in automated vehicles.362 
In December of 2018, The Verge reported that the Senate was working 
to pass an updated version of AV START.363 The outlet reported that the 
proposed amendments, which were not made public, would have addressed 
some privacy, safety, and consumer protection issues, but made no mention 
of the preemption issues discussed above.364 As of this writing, the bill has 
not passed in the Senate, but advocates continue to lobby Congress for 
national AV legislation.365  
2. Delivery Robots 
Cities have also been at the forefront of experimenting with delivery 
robots. Several cities, including Washington, D.C., Austin, Texas, and a few 
cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, have created pilot programs either 
through partnerships with firms or by passing ordinances to allow delivery 
                                                                                                                     
360 See SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 12 (2017) (requiring manufacturers of highly 
automated vehicles to, among other things, develop and notify vehicle occupants of privacy plans and 
commissioning a Federal Trade Commission study on privacy issues in the highly automated vehicle 
marketplace).  
361 Id. 
362 Texas’ and Illinois’ laws have already prevented a Google facial recognition app from running 
in both states. Melissa Locker, Google’s Art Selfie App Not Working in Texas or Illinois? Thank Tricky 
Biometric Laws, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40518224/googles-art-
selfie-app-not-working-in-texas-or-illinois-thank-tricky-biometric-laws. However, Google prevailed in 
one lawsuit about whether using photos to train its facial recognition algorithm violated the Illinois law. 
Rivera v. Google Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The judge found that the plaintiffs 
suffered no injury and so he had to dismiss the case. Id. Other cases based on the Illinois law are pending. 
Shannon Liao, Google Wins Dismissal of Facial Recognition Lawsuit Over Biometric Privacy Act, 
VERGE (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/29/18160432/google-facial-recognition-
lawsuit-dismissal-illinois-privacy-act-snapchat-facebook. Both a federal district court in San Francisco 
and the Illinois Supreme Court have recently ruled that plaintiffs do not need to show monetary damages 
to succeed in a lawsuit based on the Illinois statute: the violation of substantive privacy rights represented 
in the statute are enough to proceed with a lawsuit. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No. 
3:15-cv-03747-JD, 2018 WL 2197546, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t 
Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at *10 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019). Washington’s law was recently enacted in 2017. H.B. 
1493, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).  
363 Makena Kelly, America’s First Self-Driving Car Bill Gets Last Minute Push from Congress, 
VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18124750/av-start-act-congress-us-first-
self-driving-car-bill-tesla-gm.  
364 Id.  
365 Maggie Miller, Advocates Rally on Capitol Hill for Self-Driving Car Legislation, HILL (Dec. 3, 
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robots.366 The Austin ordinance is public, and Redwood City has published 
its partnership agreement along with reports on the pilot.367 These laws and 
agreements tend to follow the same pattern. They define where the robots 
may operate (on sidewalks, not on highways) and create a permitting system 
for firms to gain permission to test the robots.368 They also define certain 
parameters for the robot, such as the maximum weight and speed, and 
impose certain safety requirements, such as not to interfere with pedestrians 
or bicycles.369 Not every city is so welcoming, however. San Francisco 
passed an ordinance that heavily regulates personal delivery devices 
(PDDs).370 The law requires a permit for each robot being tested and limits 
the total number of permits to nine at any given time.371 It also requires a 
human operator be present at all times and limits testing to industrially zoned 
areas away from high traffic.372 The law was said to be motivated by safety 
concerns, although media reports say the legislator who introduced the 
ordinance originally considered an outright ban.373  
State and federal regulation of delivery vehicles is more nascent than 
laws for autonomous vehicles and more permissive for cities. As of writing, 
eight states have enacted laws to specifically allow and regulate delivery 
robots: Florida, Idaho, Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Utah, and 
                                                                                                                     
366 Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions of 
Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017); Lonsdorf, supra note 38. 
367 Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions of 
Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017).  
368 Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12, at *1–2 (Aug. 10, 2017) (limiting Personal Delivery 
Robotic Device operation to sidewalks); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions of Approval for Personal 
Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017) (establishing a permit system for Personal Delivery 
Devices and limiting their operation to sidewalks).  
369 Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12, at *2–3 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions 
of Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017).  
370 S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 794 (Jan. 21, 2018). For a general discussion of the San 
Francisco permit system, see Autonomous Delivery Devices, S.F. PUB. WORKS, 
https://sfpublicworks.org/services/permits/autonomous-delivery-devices.  
371 S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 794(b), (d)(3) (2018). 
372 Id. § 794(i). 
373 See Adam Brinklow, San Francisco Bans Robots From Most Sidewalks, CURBED S.F. (Dec. 6, 
2017), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/12/6/16743326/san-francisco-delivery-robot-ban (explaining that 
Board of Supervisors member Norman Yee previously wanted to ban delivery robots altogether “to 
protect public space from encroachment by private companies”); Brian Heater, San Francisco Made 
Things Much Tougher for Robotic Delivery Startups This Week, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/07/san-francisco-made-things-much-tougher-for-robotic-delivery-
startups-this-week/ (explaining that Board of Supervisors member Norman Yee’s initial language “was 
more akin to an outright ban” on delivery robots).  
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Washington.374 Each state allows cities to pass their own PDD regulations 
or safety requirements, a marked difference from state AV laws.375 
There is currently no federal law directly addressing PDDs. It is possible 
that the SELF DRIVE and AV START Acts could apply to PDDs, though 
that is far from clear. Both laws refer to section 30102 of chapter 49 of the 
U.S. Code, which defines a motor vehicle as “a vehicle driven or drawn by 
mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, 
roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail 
line.”376 While this definition arguably does not apply to PDDs that operate 
primarily on sidewalks, it could apply to larger delivery robots that operate 
on city streets. 
At least for the moment, cities can regulate PDDs as they wish, free from 
preemption at the state or federal level. One interesting phenomenon is that 
we have not found any active PDD pilot programs in cities where the state 
has passed a PDD enabling law, even though the laws in each state explicitly 
allow cities to regulate PDDs for safety or, in some cases, ban them outright. 
It could be that pilot programs are simply not necessary where state law has 
already cleared the way for PDDs to operate on city streets. However, it is 
curious that no cities in states with PDD laws have created their own 
institutional arrangements for this technology on their streets. It is possible 
that state laws have inhibited cities’ independent regulation of PDDs by 
signaling the priorities of state legislatures. 
3. Security and Entertainment 
Security robots have thus far escaped the attention of state and federal 
regulators. This is probably due to the fact that they are mostly operated on 
private property by private actors. Or perhaps they are simply less 
widespread or seen as disrupting a less vital industry than transportation or 
last-mile delivery. Should they evolve into government-controlled police 
robots, they will warrant greater regulation by state and federal actors. 
Professor Elizabeth Joh has predicted such a development and called for 
“uniform national policies” for police robots, such as the use of conditions 
                                                                                                                     
374 C.S./H.B. 1027, 2017 Leg. § 2 (Fla. 2017); H.B. 204, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Idaho 2017); 
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or strings attached to federal procurement grants to require that police 
departments enact policies governing the use of robotic force.377  
As with the state and federal levels, security robots are largely 
unregulated at the city level as well. San Francisco is again a notable 
exception. In a widely publicized incident, residents complained about a 
Knightscope robot being used to chase off homeless people in the frontage 
space and parking area of a local Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (SPCA) animal shelter in the Mission district.378 The city’s 
Department of Public Works demanded the SPCA cease using the robot 
because it was traversing public sidewalks.379 The source of the 
Department’s authority is unclear and has not been publicly disclosed.  
There has also been local action that would impact police use of robots. 
A member of the Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County drafted a 
resolution calling on Congress and the United Nations to ban killer robots, 
although he later withdrew it and the Board agreed to study the issue 
further.380 More substantively, Santa Clara County and the cities of Oakland, 
Berkeley, and Seattle have passed surveillance ordinances requiring citizen 
approval before police departments acquire new surveillance equipment.381 
Cities could easily use their proprietary power over municipal police 
departments to regulate vendor agreements with the makers of any future 
police robots, even in the absence of a surveillance ordinance.382  
As with security robots, entertainment robots are currently unregulated 
at all levels. This may be just as well, as most have not even been deployed 
in commerce yet. In some cases, the regulations for PDDs may apply, such 
as with Gita, the droid designed to “carry a case of wine.”383 Segway has 
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TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 13, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/13/security-robots-are-being-used-to-
ward-off-san-franciscos-homeless-population/.  
379 Alisha Green, Security Robot That Deterred Homeless Encampments in the Mission Gets Rebuke 
from the City, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/ 
2017/12/08/security-robot-homeless-spca-mission-san-francisco.html.  
380 David J. Canepa, Stop Killer Robots by San Mateo County Supervisor, David J. Canepa, 
COUNTY SAN MATEO BD. SUPERVISORS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://bos.smcgov.org/blog/2017-12-19/stop-
killer-robots-san-mateo-county-supervisor-david-j-canepa (“So, my office drafted . . . a resolution calling 
on the United States Congress to adopt national laws and policies restricting the development and use of 
fully autonomous weapons and the United Nations to develop an international agreement restricting the 
development and use of such weapons.”). 
381 SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCE § A40-2 (2019); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE 
OF ORDINANCE § 9.64.030 (2019); BERKELEY, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.99.030 (2019); SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 14.18.020 (2019). 
382 Briffault et al., supra note 287, at 4. But see Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of 
Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (2017), available at 
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companies).  
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also marketed package delivery as a possible use case for Loomo.384 
Loomo’s ability to carry people may qualify it to operate on city sidewalks 
as a type of personal mobility device under state law. Officials in the city of 
Austin speculated this would be true under Texas law.385 It is possible that 
as these types of urban robots proliferate, new laws may be proposed, but it 
is a little premature to speculate now.  
4. Drones 
Drones are a unique case for this Paper because they fly, and are 
therefore regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration, and because 
they have applications that cut across the categories of urban robots we have 
explored thus far. Autonomous drones that are large enough to fit a person 
could serve as a type of flying robotic taxi, while last-mile drone delivery 
has been a goal of companies (especially Amazon) for some time.386 Startup 
companies are working on security drones to monitor property, an aerial 
version of Knightscope,387 and the recreational drone was the “hot holiday 
gift” of 2016 and 2017.388 One research project even proposes to use drones 
to repair urban infrastructure.389 Drone use cases extend to several other 
fields such as construction and surveying, agriculture, and the military, but 
the four categories of urban robotics are what interest us here. 
Of all of these technologies, drones have seen the most local legislative 
action. This may be because domestic drones hit the market earlier than other 
forms of robotics or because drones incited a more visceral reaction in the 
public (serving as a “privacy catalyst”).390 The National League of Cities 
cites Chicago’s drone ordinance, passed in November 2015, as one of the 
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first comprehensive drone laws in a major city.391 The ordinance places a 
number of prohibitions on drone flights, such as: flying directly over a 
person or private property without consent; flying over a school, hospital, 
place of worship, prison, or police station; flying outside visual line of sight; 
flying between dusk and dawn; and flying for the purpose of surveillance.392 
A 2017 study by the Center for the Study of the Drone found 133 local drone 
ordinances in 31 different states.393 The author found the most common rules 
to be restrictions against flying over public property or private property 
without the owner’s consent.394  
Cities may also enforce general regulations already on the books that 
can be applied to drones. Simple criminal matters involving a drone are 
within the scope of city power to regulate. An assault committed with a 
drone is still an assault. For instance, the city of Seattle successfully 
prosecuted a reckless endangerment case against a man who lost control of 
his drone and crashed it into a woman during the 2015 Pride Parade.395 
Seattle has no law specific to drone endangerment; it simply prosecuted the 
man under Washington’s reckless endangerment statute.396 
Though there is a great deal of variety among state drone laws, many 
states have barred cities from regulating drones. According to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, forty-one states have enacted laws relating 
to drones in some form and three more have adopted resolutions.397 State 
drone laws range from anti-peeping Tom or voyeurism laws (California), to 
designations of “critical” infrastructure that define the permissible airspace 
for drones (Nevada), to prohibitions on weaponizing drones (Oregon), to 
criminal sanctions on harming people or livestock (Utah).398 Several states 
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have some kind of express preemption for local drone regulation.399 For 
instance, Florida prohibits a city from regulating the “design, manufacture, 
testing, maintenance, licensing, registration, certification, or operation” of a 
UAV,400 though cities may still enforce generally applicable laws that are 
not targeted at drones, such as nuisance, voyeurism, and reckless 
endangerment.401 Connecticut enumerates similar categories where cities are 
forbidden to regulate.402 By our count, ten other states preempt more 
broadly, prohibiting cities from enacting any regulation relating to drones 
except in very limited circumstances.403 Wyoming, however, takes a more 
collaborative approach, establishing a commission to promulgate rules in 
cooperation with the drone industry and local governments.404 
Even with all the activity by cities and states, the federal government 
remains the principal regulator of drones, setting the rules that govern 
commercial drone operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is 
the federal body charged by Congress to write rules to “safely accelerate the 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace 
system.”405 The result is the “small unmanned aircraft systems [UAS] rule” 
codified in section 107 of chapter 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.406 
Section 107 applies to drones under fifty-five pounds and requires that 
recreational and commercial drone (also called UAS for Unmanned Aerial 
System) operators obtain a drone pilot certificate and register their drone 
with the FAA.407 The rules for safe operation also prohibit flying over 400 
feet, flying over people, and flying outside visual line of sight of the 
operator.408 However, these safe operation rules can be waived with a “107 
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waiver” from the FAA.409 Legislation introduced in the Senate in 2017 
directs the FAA to create an “air carrier certificate” for companies to conduct 
package delivery via drone.410 Congress’ drone mandate made no mention 
of preemption, nor do the FAA regulations.  
On January 14, 2019, the FAA announced new proposed rules that 
would allow some drone flights over people (especially important for flights 
over cities) and at night without the need for a waiver.411 Drones that could 
demonstrate certain safety features or that had certain design elements the 
FAA deemed safe, such as non-exposed rotors, may fly over people without 
prior authorization.412 The new rules do not seek to regulate privacy, which 
the FAA considers outside its mission.413  
Proposed additional federal legislation seeks to clarify and preserve the 
authority of state and local governments to regulate drones. The Drone 
Federalism Act of 2017 directs the FAA to “ensure that the authority of a 
State, local, or tribal government to issue reasonable restrictions on the time, 
manner, and place of operation of a civil unmanned aircraft system that is 
operated below 200 feet above ground level or within 200 feet of a structure 
is not preempted.”414 It also requires the FAA to receive permission from 
property owners before authorizing “the operation of a civil unmanned 
aircraft in the immediate reaches of the airspace above property.”415 
Congress has taken, or at least considered, a much more collaborative 
approach with states and cities for drones than for AVs. 
Statements by the FAA and a recent federal district court case indicate 
that federal drone rules operate under conflict preemption, leaving room for 
states and cities to regulate so long as they do not conflict with federal law. 
In 2015, the FAA’s Office of Chief Counsel issued a document that warned 
states and localities against creating a patchwork of rules that would hinder 
nationwide UAS safety, but listed examples of where states and localities 
would have authority to act.416 Examples include warrant requirements for 
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police use of drones and peeping Tom laws.417 The Agency also recently 
instituted a program for states, cities, and tribal authorities to partner with 
companies to bypass existing regulations more easily and experiment with 
advanced UAS applications at the local level.418 
A recent court case also concluded that the FAA rules operated under 
conflict preemption, not field preemption. Singer v. Newton related to a city 
ordinance that sought to impose certain regulations on drone flight within 
the city.419 The city of Newton, Massachusetts passed a drone ordinance that 
applied to drone flights within the city limits.420 Michael Singer, an 
FAA-certified drone pilot who resides in Newton, challenged provisions that 
required drone operators to register with the city, banned flights over private 
property without the property owner’s permission, banned flights over 
Newton city property without permission, and required visual line of sight 
flight.421 The ordinance also banned drone surveillance and interference with 
manned aircraft, but Singer only challenged the previous four provisions.422 
He argued that air safety is normally solely regulated by the FAA, so field 
preemption should apply.423 However, Judge Young noted the FAA’s 
statements about preserving some authority for state and local governments 
to regulate.424 At the same time, he concluded that the FAA had not created 
“an express carve-out for state and localities to regulate,” but rather hinted 
that “whether parallel regulations are enforceable depends on the principles 
of conflict preemption.”425 
The judge invalided each of the challenged provisions under conflict 
preemption. The FAA expressed its intent to be the “exclusive regulatory 
authority” for drones in the navigable airspace, and therefore the city’s 
registration provision was invalid.426 The judge concluded that Newton’s 
requirement that drone flights over private and public property first obtain 
permission was effectively a ban on drone flights over the city, which 
frustrated the FAA and Congress’ intent to integrate drones into the 
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airspace.427 Finally, the judge ruled that the line of sight rule impermissibly 
intervened “in the FAA’s careful regulation of aircraft safety” because the 
FAA allows visual observers to augment line of sight flight or outright 
waivers of that requirement.428 The court’s ruling makes sense given the 
FAA’s policy statements about letting states and localities act in the drone 
space. However, it should stand as a warning against regulation that even 
seems like a ban on drones in the airspace. State or municipal attempts to 
regulate drone safety are especially suspect.429 
Many city drone regulations would likely be preempted by either state 
or federal law, especially if they do not contain a savings provision. For 
instance, some of the Chicago provisions are similar to those overturned in 
Newton, namely the ban on flights over private property.430 However, the 
Chicago ordinance contains an exception for any flights authorized by 
federal or state law.431 It is important to note that this ordinance passed in 
2015, before the FAA promulgated its current regulations. The FAA 
currently allows waivers for flights outside visual line of sight, at night, or 
over populated areas,432 so without an exception allowing for such flights, 
the Chicago ordinance would almost certainly be preempted. A report by the 
Center for the Study of the Drone concluded that many of these city drone 
rules could conflict with federal or state laws.433 The Newton case may 
inspire others to challenge local drone ordinances, although the FAA was 
not involved in that case and has not yet challenged any such laws itself. The 
federal scheme relying on conflict preemption still leaves room for cities to 
regulate, however, as many local drone ordinances relate to privacy or 
trespass, which the FAA has deemed within the scope of local authority to 
act.434 
States with blanket prohibitions on city drone laws will naturally be 
much more constraining for cities. Cities will only be able to pass generally 
applicable laws that happen to include conduct by drones, such as reckless 
endangerment. The bounds of this authority are unclear and may need to be 
tested in court. For instance, a city might pass an ordinance that does not 
mention drones but defines trespass as causing an object to hover up to fifty 
feet over private property. Is this a generally applicable law or a back door 
into a drone ban?  
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C. Preemption Can Interfere with Robotic and Environmental Design 
The preceding sections have shown how cities are playing an active role 
as testbeds of emerging robotics technologies and governance models. They 
have also shown that city authority in this area can be limited by both state 
and federal law and that the interplay of different levels of regulation can be 
complex and unclear. This Section argues that preemption at the state and 
federal levels will impact design decisions made about autonomous systems 
and the local built environment and may unintentionally foreclose some 
design choices, thereby stifling innovation. 
The legal rules that govern urban robots will have consequences for 
autonomous systems and the urban built environment, and vice versa. For 
example, speed limits for automated vehicles or delivery robots will 
determine the machine’s top speed. Or zoning laws will influence a 
neighborhood’s use and character, including the design of public spaces and 
restrictions on the commingling of people with robotics. Laws that set a 
particular weight limit for machines enable some designs while foreclosing 
others. This very problem has occurred with some state delivery robot laws. 
Virginia’s law defines a delivery robot as weighing under fifty pounds, but 
Marble, one of the main delivery robot startups, uses a machine that weighs 
over eighty pounds.435 Some accused Marble’s competitor of writing the law 
to close off competition.436 A law that requires a robot to yield to 
pedestrians437 effectively requires the design of sensing and processing 
capabilities to achieve this end. On the other hand, laws that require people 
yield to robots could dramatically reshape environmental design. Such was 
the case with the advent of the automobile and jaywalking laws.438  
Urban robotics, environmental design, and legal rules will likely interact 
in more indirect or diffuse ways that are nonetheless impactful on the local 
level. The placement of any future restricted automated vehicle “hyperlanes” 
could have significant opportunity costs by influencing the distribution of 
travel modes onto other transportation infrastructure. One major study has 
shown that ride-sharing apps increase traffic and reduce public transit 
ridership.439 This effect could get worse if the cost of automated vehicle 
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ride-sharing plummets, and it further introduces the prospect, so evident 
today in cities with dockless car and bike share systems, of automated 
vehicles occupying streets and utilizing energy without passengers at all. In 
terms of long-term planning, it is important to consider that the provision of 
transportation infrastructure and services influences where people live in 
cities.440 Transportation economists have long advocated for congestion 
pricing on roads to offset increases in miles traveled, and while this may be 
applied to automated vehicles, the need for increased density, specifically in 
public rights-of-way, highlights the need for other pricing structures, such 
as occupancy-based pricing for automated vehicles to promote shared 
vehicle and transit-scale systems.441 In all, there will likely be many 
unforeseen consequences to the proliferation of cheap, diffuse networks of 
last-mile logistics and public safety machines in the form of delivery and 
security robots, as well as automated vehicles for passengers and cargo. 
Changes brought about by new technology often have consequences for 
environmental design and therefore need regulation that is sensitive to local 
context. Consider the impact of room sharing (Airbnb) on urban housing 
markets. While the anticipated death of the hotel business never came to 
pass, some research suggests that Airbnb contributes to housing shortages 
and drives up rents.442 This effect has been attributed to property owners 
permanently shifting their homes from the rental market to “private 
accommodations,” and Airbnb has worked with local governments to 
combat this practice.443 This is just one example of technology’s impact on 
local environmental design and legal rules, and more is in store as the 
industrial organization of the transportation sector shifts from the 
concentrated ownership of information technologies in today’s sharing 
economy to more concentrated ownership of the mobile assets on the street.  
State and federal laws that preempt cities on robotics may disrupt the 
natural interplay between the design of autonomous systems, urban 
environments, and local law, and so state and federal lawmakers should 
consider the local impacts of robotics laws and be wary of broad preemption. 
The controversy over the weight definition of PDDs locking out some 
models of PDDs is one example.444 Right now, the regulation in this space 
is still developing, but the chances of future conflict arise as more laws 
relating to automated vehicles are enacted. Proposals for exclusive 
automated vehicle highway lanes have already been floated to some state 
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legislators.445 A proposed law in Illinois would require infrastructure updates 
for networked sensors that would collect vehicle and pedestrian traffic data 
and send it to automated vehicles.446 These laws are likely just the beginning. 
Further, there is a recent history of cities attempting to regulate these 
technologies, only to have states preempt them and reverse those rules.447 
Advocates have also expressed concern over proposed federal automated 
vehicle laws that preempt “unreasonable restrictions” on these products.448 
Not only could the law upset the regulatory balance between the federal 
government and states (and localities by extension), but the term 
“unreasonable restrictions” is seen as overly vague.449 
In addition, legislating to specific verticals of robotics may prevent cities 
from planning holistically as technologies converge in robotics platforms. 
Consider the state laws enabling PDDs. Eight state laws allow PDDs and 
define them as “an electrically powered device that is operated on 
sidewalks, shared-use paths, and crosswalks and intended primarily to 
transport property” or something similar.450 This definition serves its 
purpose of providing explicit permission for delivery robots to operate 
within the state. It is written narrowly to cover delivery robots as they 
currently exist.451 However, new robots are already being marketed that can 
serve more than one function; they can be delivery robots, security robots, 
or personal mobility devices.452 What had previously been distinct categories 
of robot are beginning to converge into a multifunctional platform. If a 
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https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA132-HB-49; S. 1207, 2017 
Sess. (Va. 2017), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?171+ful+CHAP0251; SB 148, 2017-2018 
Wis. Leg. (Wis. 2017), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/acts/13. Washington and Utah’s 
laws use a slightly different but similar definition. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-1119(1)(c) (Westlaw 
through 2019 2d Special Sess.); HB 1325, 66th Sess. (Wash. 2019).  
451 Except for Marble’s robots, of course.  
452 Nick Lavars, Segway’s Loomo Transporter Does Double Duty As a Robot, NEW ATLAS (Mar. 
6, 2018), https://newatlas.com/segway-loomo-transporter-robot/53677/.  
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machine can be both a delivery robot and a security device, which law 
applies? Does the applicable law change depending on how the robot is 
being used? Delivery robots are also defined as machines that operate on the 
sidewalk, but it is at least conceivable that engineers could build a robot that 
is equally capable of operating on both the sidewalk and the street. In fact, 
Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Aspen Institute categorize delivery robots 
as a type of automated vehicle.453 The convergence of delivery robots and 
automated vehicles could accelerate if cities redesign their streets for mixed 
robotic traffic, as some have suggested.454 So far, the states with PDD laws 
have left room for cities to act, although some are more permissive than 
others. For instance, Idaho allows cities to regulate PDDs for safe 
operation,455 but it is not clear how the Idaho law would handle the 
technological convergence described. This is another reason to allow cities 
the freedom to experiment and regulate accordingly. 
There are of course some situations where regulatory certainty and 
uniform guidelines are warranted, and preemption may be the appropriate 
tool to achieve that policy end. We simply caution that when it comes to 
urban robots, preemption is a design issue in addition to a legal question. 
D. Federalism for Urban Autonomy 
This Section lays out specific recommendations for federal, state, and 
local authorities to craft their rules governing robots to avoid preemption 
interfering with local design. 
Perhaps most pressingly, the preemption provisions of the SELF DRIVE 
and AV START Acts should be amended and clarified to preserve local 
authority over the built environment even when decisions about the 
environmental design have impacts on design or performance. The 
definition of “performance” specifications that are subject to preemption 
should not include the operational domain, i.e., the built urban environment. 
The AV START Act should include a specific exemption so that local 
governments are not preempted when regulating their own built 
environments that constitute the operational domain of AVs. A sunset 
provision for this exemption may be appropriate to reflect the fact that AVs 
are still in an experimental stage, but that stage will not last forever. The 
SELF DRIVE Act has already passed in the House, but it will likely need to 
be amended to resolve the differences with the AV START Act. SELF 
DRIVE’s preemption language should be narrowed, and the authority of 
cities to act as sites of experimentation expressly recognized.  
                                                                                                                     
453 BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES & ASPEN INST., TAMING THE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE: A PRIMER 
FOR CITIES 14–15 (2017), https://avsincities.bloomberg.org/downloads/Taming_the_ 
Autonomous_Vehicle.pdf; NACTO, supra note 5, at 49.  
454 NACTO, supra note 5, at 8. 
455 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-605 (Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 65th Idaho 
Legislature). 
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These changes are the minimum needed to preserve cities as sites of 
experimentation. An even better model to follow is the Drone Federalism 
Act and the FAA’s own policy statements on preserving state and local 
authority in certain spheres. This approach could be combined with the 
Massachusetts model, which allows cities to coordinate and cooperate with 
state regulators and industry. This would allow cities to experiment to find 
the design and operational domain for AVs and the governance structures 
that best promote autonomous technology and the public good. 
For other forms of urban robots, legislatures should expressly recognize 
and carve out authority for cities where the law impacts environmental 
design, including the deployment of related sensors and other information 
communication systems. States should recognize city home rule authority 
over environmental design and over system design to the extent it impacts 
environmental design. The state PDD laws that do this, especially Illinois’, 
are a good model to follow. Again, FAA policy on state and local authority 
and the Massachusetts model for AVs are good approaches. Legislatures 
should consider the relative costs for firms and cities that preemption can 
create by forcing certain design parameters or precluding market 
competition. Robotics laws should work in the public interest and not force 
cities to bear socialized costs of system design. 
Courts should recognize that local government design choices over their 
public rights-of-way are legitimate exercises of police power, not obstacles 
to federal rules that are meant to encourage the adoption of robots. They 
should define conflict in preemption cases related to robots narrowly. 
Choices about whether to offer robot fast lanes, whether to create designated 
robot zones, how to structure parking for shared robo-taxi fleets, and even 
how to price congestion to reduce traffic, all have a local character. Courts 
should only find preemption if it is clear that federal or state legislatures 
intended to preempt those design choices. This also means courts should 
avoid field preemption because broad readings of legislative intent will 
displace city prerogatives in local design. 
Cities should not tempt fate by regulating so heavily that they draw a 
preemption challenge in court or inspire legislatures to act.456 Robotics 
ordinances should work with state and federal laws, not against them. 
Chicago was wise to create exceptions to its ordinance to avoid a preemption 
conflict. 
Altogether, we advocate for true federalism in the system of robotics 
law. Cities should serve as the sites of experimentation for robotic system, 
environmental, and legal design. States can provide backstop rules that 
ensure cities act in the public interest, for example, by setting rules against 
                                                                                                                     
456 The ACS notes that instances of punitive preemption, where state legislatures target cities to 
overturn specific laws, are on the rise. Briffault et al., supra note 287, at 5.  
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privacy harms or discrimination that could be exacerbated by robotics.457 
They can also handle intrastate regional issues as they arise. The federal 
government can provide technical and regulatory guidance, issue grants, 
and, after the technology has had a chance to evolve through 
experimentation in cities, create rules for robots in interstate commerce. 
States and the federal government should adopt policies that limit or ban the 
practices that place cities in a race to the bottom. There are a growing 
number of proposals to balance deals between firms and cities in favor of 
the public interest, such as curtailing the use of non-disclosure agreements 
between cities and firms.458 Other policy tools will likely be relevant as well. 
For instance, there is a growing recognition that more vigorous antitrust 
enforcement may be necessary for large tech companies.459 As robotics firms 
seek to become indispensable service platforms providing everything from 
urban mobility to home delivery, state and federal antitrust regulators should 
watch carefully for similar antitrust concerns in physical urban spaces as in 
online spaces. Through careful, evidence-based policy, each level of 
government plays to its relative institutional strengths,460 while preserving 
local autonomy. Lawmakers at every level of government should remember 
that development of both robotics systems and the built environment can 
evolve over time, sometimes in unexpected ways. They should be platform 
agnostic to avoid early “lock-in” of design or the built environment. 
Robotics technologies are also likely to converge, which may render some 
rules out of date. 
                                                                                                                     
457 Judith Donath, Driverless Cars Could Make Transportation Free for Everyone—With a Catch, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/self-driving-cars-
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458 For examples of the harms caused by such NDAs, see Caroline O’Donovan, When Cities Sign 
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see Lina M. Kahn, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (2016). 
460 For a discussion of this dynamic specifically applied to drones and privacy, see Margot E. 
Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2013).   
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V. COUNTERARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BROAD PREEMPTION OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
This Part concerns counterarguments, such as the need for regulatory 
clarity and consistency, the idea that state and national regulators are in a 
better position to negotiate with firms than cities, and the notion that cities 
do not necessarily act in the best interest of the region. 
A. Firms Require Regulatory Clarity/Consistent Rules 
Proponents of preemption might cite the need for regulatory clarity or 
consistent rules to ease the way for firms. Automated vehicle manufacturers 
have made such arguments in favor of the federal SELF DRIVE Act.461 
Having to plan for and comply with fifty state-automated vehicle laws is 
more complicated, and therefore costlier, than just dealing with one federal 
law. In addition, being cars, automated vehicles are highly mobile and will 
eventually cross state lines. For the legal requirements to differ between 
states such that an automated vehicle from California cannot cross the border 
into Nevada without violating the law would be troublesome, to say the least. 
Overcoming such obstacles to interstate commerce is one of the reasons the 
federal government exists in the first place. Put another way, scale matters 
with technology. 
We are sympathetic to these arguments and even grant that regulatory 
uncertainty can be a burden on firms, but the burden to firms is only part of 
the overall story. First, uncertainty creates a cost, and costs can either be 
internalized by firms or socialized to the public. Avoiding preemption allows 
for cities to be sites of experimentation and true partners in the system and 
environmental design for urban robots. Preemption may cut off that process 
too early. There will be a time when nationwide standards make sense, but 
it should be after cities have had a chance to experiment. In the meantime, 
the principle of permissionless innovation, which likely applies to automated 
vehicles and many other robots,462 should insulate firms from the worst 
regulatory excesses. Second, innovation proceeds unevenly, so regulatory 
standardization should as well. Certain safety standards may make sense to 
implement on a statewide or national level now.463 But there will be other 
areas where cities require room to experiment, especially as it impacts 
environmental design. There are situations with technology where scale can 
have undesirable consequences. For example, possible concern with creating 
a national health database is fear of a massive data breach that compromises 
the personal health data of every American, and as the integration of 
                                                                                                                     
461 Bellon, supra note 349. 
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surveillance technology expands in service to the transportation industry, 
these issues will be compounded. Scaling a system of unsafe or inefficient 
AVs by acting too early is not a desirable outcome. 
It is also possible to achieve some harmony and an environment that 
favors innovation without imposing a nationwide standard with broad 
preemption of local governments. The system of federalism for which we 
advocate recognizes roles for state and federal regulators. It merely 
preserves the design space for cities. 
B. State/National Agencies Are in Better Bargaining Position vis a vis 
Firms 
Another critique that is somewhat related to the first one is that scale 
matters in regulation. State legislatures and attorneys general may have more 
bargaining power as negotiators of the public interest. National regulators 
have even more bargaining power. Cities may become caught in a race to 
the bottom by attempting to lure firms, or they may get captured by special 
interests.464  
Concerns that cities will race to the bottom by giving away public goods 
to robotics firms are warranted; we raised them ourselves above. For that 
reason, we think state rules that guard against socialized costs are a good 
idea. This is part of the reason that we hold up Massachusetts as a model; it 
allows cities to experiment while the state acts as a backstop to preserve the 
public interest. Still, any preemption provision for urban robots should 
weigh the potential regulatory economies of scale against the benefits of 
innovation with cities as distributed sites of experimentation. Further, cities 
have their own power as market makers when they are able to deal directly 
with firms.465 We also reiterate our support for backstop rules such as bans 
on non-disclosure agreements in public-private partnerships to help guard 
against such problems.  
C. Cities Do Not Act in the Best Interest of the Region (NIMBY) 
One might argue that cities will not plan in the best interest of the region 
or state as a whole, but instead regulate for narrow interests defined by 
NIMBY-ism (Not In My Back Yard). NIMBY-ism has been a problem in 
other intractable urban and regional planning issues like housing466 and 
transportation.467 The Competitive Enterprise Institute, a libertarian think 
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465 Whittington et al., supra note 11, at 1964. 
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tank, worries that ride-sharing companies will pressure cities to outlaw 
private ownership of automated vehicles by touting the environmental 
benefits of shared fleets.468 The group praised states that preempt cities in 
their laws to avoid just this outcome.469 
We are sensitive to this concern as well. Cities are not and should not be 
the only stakeholders in regional planning. For cities to succeed in our 
model, they must operate within a patchwork of federal and state regulation 
and cooperate with private companies and regional stakeholders. We agree 
with Sarah Fox that regional tools like environmental impact reports or 
statements can support density or other positive regional planning goals.470 
We also envision a possible role for Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
that can coordinate the needs of multiple cities in a given region; this is a 
common tool in regional transportation planning.471 Still, giving cities the 
tools to regulate robots means that some cities may abuse those tools. 
Further, the notion of experimentation implies that some failure will occur. 
But if cities are the site of experimentation, at least those failures won’t 
proliferate across the entire state or country by fiat. Cities are not the only 
actors who can err in urban planning. For instance, some scholars believe 
that federal policy has contributed to suburban sprawl and low-density 
housing.472  
To the specific concern that cities will ban individual car ownership, it 
is also possible that states could use preemption and enact policies that favor 
individual ownership to benefit entrenched interests, such as car 
manufacturers.473 Without taking a specific position on individual ownership 
of automated vehicles, we note that almost any policy choice will favor some 
interests over others. The question is which level of policymakers will make 
those choices. We argue in favor of local political bodies, as they must deal 
most directly with the consequences of those choices and are the most 
politically accountable for those choices. 
CONCLUSION 
Widespread deployment of robots in cities has the potential to drastically 
alter the way cities organize their public spaces and built environments. As 
the testbeds for this emerging technology, cities must have room to regulate 
                                                                                                                     
468 Scribner, supra note 309. 
469 Id. 
470 Fox, supra note 356, at 174–82.  
471 What Is a COG or MPO?, NAT’L ASS’N REG’L COUNCILS,  http://narc.org/about/what-is-a-cog-
or-mpo/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2019). 
472 GERRIT KNAPP ET AL., DEP’T URB. & REGIONAL PLAN., U. ILL., GOVERNMENT POLICY AND 
URBAN SPRAWL 1–5 (2014), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.505.9245&rep 
=rep1&type=pdf.  
473 Marina Lao et al., Direct-to-Consumer Auto Sales: It’s Not Just About Tesla, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (May 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/05/direct-
consumer-auto-sales-its-not-just-about-tesla.  
 
408 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
these technologies in ways that fit the realities of the local built environment 
and local constituencies. While this technology is in the experimental stage, 
state and federal lawmakers should avoid broad field preemption to preserve 
a regulatory space for cities to design public spaces in a way that best serves 
the public interest. Rather than rushing prematurely to a state or nationwide 
standard, state and federal lawmakers should implement regulatory floors 
and backstops against a race to the bottom. Issues that do not implicate the 
design of the local built environment, such as vehicle safety or cybersecurity, 
may be ripe for such intervention. State and federal governments can also 
serve as conveners and disseminate experimental results and best practices 
in order to build consensus toward nationwide standards. The potential of 
robotics technology to deliver convenience, efficiency, and other benefits is 
exciting, and the urge to standardize in the name of promoting innovation is 
understandable. But that urge is misguided when the impacts of the 
technology are likely to be consequential yet unknown. 
For their part, cities must ensure that robots promote the public interest 
rather than socialize costs that ought to be borne by firms. They should 
recognize their power as market makers when dealing with companies 
seeking to test their technologies in urban spaces. Local policymakers have 
both a civic and moral duty to do so. More work is needed to explore the 
possibility of a fiduciary duty or standard of care for cities that implement 
pilot programs or procure new technologies.474 City policymakers should be 
able to demonstrate their careful consideration of the impacts to privacy, 
safety, public finances, and public spaces. The implementation of citizen 
review committees for surveillance technologies may be one step toward this 
goal.   
Urban robots are likely to reorganize not just the built environment but 
the social fabric of cities as well. Challenges to traditional notions of privacy 
(or lack thereof) in public spaces are just one manifestation of the social 
impact of urban robotics. For instance, marginalized communities of color 
could experience urban robots differently than more affluent communities, 
especially as a tool of law enforcement. There are also concerns that AVs 
could be used as a tool of social control by governments or for companies to 
exert undue influence on their passengers.475 
Preempting a city’s ability to regulate “performance,” as AV START 
and SELF DRIVE do, could have far reaching implications beyond the 
technical specifications of the autonomous system. Robotics technologies 
such as AVs are envisioned as key components in the creation of a cutting 
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edge “smart transportation” system.476 However, if preemption prevents 
cities from directing these new transportation services, then local 
governments may struggle to ensure equity and access. A city that wishes to 
direct AV services to poor or minority areas might be prevented from doing 
so if a court finds this to be an “unreasonable” restriction on the AV’s 
performance or operational domain. Or, preemption could remove a city’s 
leverage to push companies toward more equitable services because local 
governments are forced to allow AVs on their public rights-of-way. This 
problem is not merely academic: a ride-sharing company called Via was 
found to have discriminated against poor and minority communities for 
years by confining its services to affluent areas of Washington, D.C. in 
violation of local law.477 
The importance of design in local preemption debates should have 
application beyond robotics. As cities flex their power as economic and 
cultural engines in American society, they have repeatedly come into 
conflict with state and federal lawmakers. Preemption has been central to 
issues ranging from ride-sharing to short term rentals. Considerations of 
design and the built environment may not be the principal factor in deciding 
how to allocate authority over policymaking in these spheres, but they may 
still prove a useful facet through which to understand these problems. 
More broadly, this Paper urges regulators at all levels to think carefully 
about the nature of robotics and the role of cities as sites of experimentation. 
For the sake of simplicity and organization, we have treated AVs, PDDs, 
security robots, entertainment robots, and drones as distinct devices. This is 
in part because the law has applied different rules as well. However, these 
devices share some common technical features and may have similar 
impacts as emerging technologies. Right now, governments apply different 
regulatory regimes based on the device classification and the nature of the 
right-of-way in which they operate: sidewalks versus streets versus airways. 
But as the technology converges, this regulatory separation may not be 
appropriate. Rather, from a designer’s perspective, the sensible approach 
could be to treat cities as a single operating domain for this family of 
technologies we call robots. Doing so will require a paradigm shift in 
regulatory approaches and an emphasis on the city as the site of 
experimentation for new governance models. Cities, for their part, must 
learn to navigate the minefield of preemption and environmental design 
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issues to foster experimentation with new technologies and new governance 
models for the sake of the public good. Cities are on the forefront of other 
important policy debates, such as how to implement a universal basic 
income.478 This Paper has attempted to help cities understand all of the tools 
that are available to them and the limits and contours of their authority to 
accomplish this task. The robotic future will be made in cities and will be 
felt most directly by the people who live there, so cities must take an active 
role in shaping it. 
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